

Onwards to 2030

MIGRATION: FUTURES STUDY

Report



Adviescommissie voor
Vreemdelingenzaken

The ACVZ

The Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (ACVZ) in the Netherlands is an independent committee that advises Government and Parliament on immigration law and policy. International and EU-aspects as well as human rights issues are also addressed in the advisory reports. Furthermore the ACVZ reports on proposals to amend the Aliens Act 2000 and the Aliens Decree 2000.

Colophon

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Literature

A 3D illustration of a white, stylized human figure sitting on a large blue number '6'. The figure is holding a newspaper with the word 'NEWS' on it. The background is a gradient of blue and orange, with several semi-transparent squares in various shades of blue and purple. The figure is positioned in the center-right of the frame, and the number '6' is on the left. The overall scene is set against a light blue and orange background.

Section 1

Introduction

1.1 Background

On 28 June 2016, the Minister for Migration asked the Advisory Committee on Migration Affairs (Adviescommissie voor Vreemdelingenzaken, ACVZ) to carry out a futures study on the issue of 'Migration Management 2030'.¹ He requested the ACVZ to:

'(...) carry out a study into a sustainable long-term migration system that is not swayed by the issues of the day and carefully examines policy developments that will be necessary in the future.'

This report is the ACVZ's response to this request.

1.2 Purpose, target group and scope of study

By means of this futures study, the ACVZ wishes to contribute to the further development of a medium-term vision concerning migration management. Firstly, the report can serve as a basis for anyone who is considering the issue of migration in a systematic manner (professionally or otherwise), including how we can optimally handle this issue in the future. The ACVZ also hopes that this report will bring more depth to the societal debate regarding current and future migration policy. The migration debate is currently heavily influenced by the issues of the day, with individual cases (such as the residence status of Mauro or Sahar) or unexpected developments (such as the huge increase in asylum seekers in 2015 and 2016) dominating the discussion in the period following their occurrence. It would therefore be useful to take a step back and carefully consider the context within which global migration will take place in the future, the position that the Netherlands will take on this issue and the corresponding regulatory frameworks that will be adopted.

This futures study will also give a rough outline (particularly in Section 4) of several instruments that can help the government and parliament to shape the policy in a certain way. The ACVZ is certainly not suggesting that it formulates a comprehensive package of measures for the next twelve years, and the concrete policy measures formulated in this report should therefore be seen more as a foundation upon which further measures can be based.

The ACVZ does not intend to use this futures study to manoeuvre policy in a certain direction. Migration policy is an issue that involves major value judgements and achieving normative consensus will require substantial efforts in a wide range of areas. We have therefore selected a method that enables multiple visions of migration policy (some of which are actually diametrically opposed to one another) to be presented, in which capacity ACVZ remains entirely impartial regarding the desirability and accuracy of these visions.

This futures study has primarily been executed for the Dutch government as a whole (not just for the Minister for Migration), as the research conducted for this study showed that cooperation between multiple departments is vital to the further development of a future-proof migration system.

The study may also be useful to other organisations. After all, central government is far from the only actor involved in the issue of migration, with municipalities, the business sector and civic organisations also playing an important role. The ACVZ hopes this study will provide all organisations and other parties involved with clear insight into who is responsible for what and what can and cannot be done with regard to migration management in the period between now and 2030.

The ACVZ has decided to restrict the scope of this futures study to immigration into the Netherlands (as a Member State of the EU), including economic, family and asylum migration. Although a substantial number of migrants to the Netherlands are EU citizens, the free movement of EU citizens and their family members has not been included in the futures study.² The reason for this is that the Dutch government's freedom to make decisions on migration policy regarding EU citizens is very limited and depends entirely on the future development of the EU and whether the Netherlands remains an EU Member State in the future.

The issue of migration from the Netherlands (with the exception of repatriation of foreign nationals with no residence permit and circular migration)³ has also been excluded from consideration during this study. Although emigration is not included in the scope of this study, it is useful to realise that there is often mutuality between many countries when it comes to migration (Houtum & Lucassen, 2016, p. 25). An open migration policy for the Netherlands will give Dutch residents, including migrants who have moved here, greater opportunities to emigrate/re-emigrate if they wish, while a restrictive migration policy for the Netherlands will probably also restrict opportunities for Dutch residents to move abroad. In addition, it is vital to note that immigration is often temporary in nature; not all immigrants move to our country permanently, as a proportion of them emigrate from the Netherlands at a later date.

Developments in the Netherlands with regard to immigration are heavily dependent on developments in other countries. Furthermore, when it comes to migration management, the Dutch government is also dependent on other parties, such as other states, the EU, municipalities, entrepreneurs and civic organisations. The role that these third parties play or could play has therefore been included in this study whenever relevant.

1.3 Research method: scenario study

We cannot predict the future. Nor can we engineer the future with 100% accuracy. As the Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, WRR) puts it, 'The future is open, though it is not empty', which means the 'open space' – the range of possible futures – is limited by events, decisions and actions taken in the past and present (WRR, 2010, pp. 53-54). Futures studies enable us to systematically examine what the future may have in store and what type of policy could be developed to deal with it.

There are various methods available for conducting futures studies,⁴ and in the opinion of the WRR, two questions are essential when selecting a method:

- Can you expect stability and continuity?
- Can you expect normative consensus?

Migration is a policy area that involves major uncertainty about future developments. Multiple factors are involved that often mutually affect each other in a way that we do not understand either entirely or at all. In addition, the institutional environment within which migration policy is developed is complicated and constantly subject to change; the international community, the EU and the Dutch state all play an important role. As a result, stability and continuity cannot be expected.

Furthermore, a normative consensus is completely lacking. It is unlikely that any other issue in the last twenty years has polarised opinions as much as migration, and the normative contrast on this issue within society is substantial. It is therefore clear that any examination of a future-proof migration system must take into account the substantial uncertainty concerning future developments, the major value judgements involved in migration policy and the fact that no consensus can be expected in the near future regarding the desirability of the policy direction.

The reality of the situation is too complex to pin down and the future is too uncertain to predict. Based on this principle, a scenario study is the most suitable research method for this futures study. Rather than projecting linear developments of existing trends into the future, scenario studies are based on the principle that multiple future scenarios are possible. This scenario study consists of the following steps:

1. developing contextual scenarios;
2. developing policy scenarios;
3. testing the policy scenarios against the contextual scenarios.

The four contextual scenarios specifically reflect the complexity of the situation and the uncertainty of the future, while the three policy scenarios are based on the various normative principles expressed by participants in the migration debate. The method used is explained below.

Contextual scenarios

Contextual scenarios are conceivable future situations in which possible developments are clustered in a logical manner. This means that the contextual scenarios are not desired situations, but simply describe what could possibly happen. While formulating the contextual scenarios, the ACVZ strove to explore the 'limits of the conceivable' to ensure the contextual scenarios are sufficiently distinct from one another. In addition, the decision was made to exclude any extreme contextual scenarios and to disregard any events that are highly unlikely, yet would have extremely substantial consequences in the event of their occurrence⁵, also known as 'game changers' (Taleb, 2010).⁶

Contextual scenarios are not prognoses or predictions; they are more like thought experiments. The contextual scenarios focus on 'exogenous factors', which are factors that influence migration and migration policy, but can only be controlled by the government to a limited extent, if at all. The contextual scenarios were formulated in accordance with the following step-by-step plan.

1. Inventory of developments

The first step was to conduct a survey among policy officers at the Ministry of Justice and Security (then the Ministry of Security and Justice) and the implementing bodies responsible for executing aliens policy, such as the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst, IND), the Repatriation & Departure Service (Dienst Terugkeer & Vertrek, DT&V) and the Central Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers (Centraal Orgaan opvang Asielzoekers, COA). The survey was also completed by members, former members and secretarial staff of the ACVZ. The survey asked the respondents to name the exogenous factors they believed would significantly affect migration and migration policy in the period between now and 2030, including national, European and international factors. The survey was completed by a total of 41 respondents.

2. Qualification of developments

The results of the survey were discussed during a workshop attended by a mix of committee members and civil servants, the goal of which was to select which developments the survey respondents and workshop attendees believed would have the most significant effect on migration and involved the greatest uncertainty. In addition, a number of developments that would have a

substantial impact and for which it is almost certain how these developments will play out were taken into consideration.

3. Determining the scale at which developments will play out: a trend analysis

Following this workshop, the ACVZ conducted a trend analysis that closely examined all of the factors identified. Wherever possible – this trend analysis is based on reports from authoritative institutions. This was done based on the assumption that these institutions thoroughly researched their reports and based them on up-to-date scientific insights and discussions.

These institutions are:

- for global trends: the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank;
- for European trends: the European Commission;
- for Dutch trends: the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (Centraal Planbureau, CPB), the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, SCP), Statistics Netherlands (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, CBS), the Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, WRR), the Advisory Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (Adviesraad voor Wetenschap, Technologie en Innovatie, AWTI) and the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving, PBL).


The trend analysis is included in Section 2 of this report.

4. Incorporating the developments into contextual scenarios

The ACVZ subsequently developed four contextual scenarios based on the aforementioned preliminary study. This was done using a coordinate system with the factor of 'social cohesion' on the x-axis and the group of factors 'globalisation', 'international legal order' and 'international cooperation' on the y-axis to enable variation. These are the factors that ACVZ believes will have the greatest impact and whose future development is most uncertain. The other uncertain factors were then distributed across the coordinate system as well, attached to the y-axis without any further variation. For the purposes of the coordinate system, logical coherence between the factors is assumed in order to limit the complexity of the study.⁷ Factors that are virtually certain to occur were not included in the coordinate system. No variation of these factors was introduced and they have been incorporated into every contextual scenario.

The graph is displayed in Figure 1. Further explanation of the contextual scenarios can be found in Section 3.

Figure 1: Contextual Scenarios for Migration in 2030



During this stage of the study, the ACVZ was supported by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (Koninklijke Academie voor Wetenschappen, KNAW), which organised a study day to enable the identified exogenous factors and their impact on the issue of migration to be presented to a selection of experts in the relevant fields.

Policy scenarios

The policy scenarios address the areas in which the Dutch government has freedom to act, as opposed to the factors in the contextual scenarios, over which the Dutch government has little to no control.⁸ These policy scenarios each explore a future situation considered desirable by a portion of society, with regard to a policy area (hereinafter referred to as 'visions') and the strategy that will be necessary in order to realise this vision. Policy scenarios give insight into the various ways of tackling particular problems and could also promote more open discussion of the values and objectives and provide inspiration for new ground to be broken (PBL, 2013, p. 50). Policy scenarios are usually based on one particular value dominating the course of policy in the decades to come, meaning that, in contrast to contextual scenarios, they are normative in nature. The ACVZ has formulated three policy scenarios that represent as many distinct positions in the policy debate as possible and therefore provide the greatest insight into policy alternatives. In formulating the visions, the ACVZ remains

entirely impartial regarding their desirability; they are simply an acknowledgement of the fact that they exist. The policy scenarios describe ways in which the different visions could become reality.

These policy scenarios are:

- Dutch economic interests;
- Humanitarian mandate;
- Burden on society.

The policy scenarios are recorded in detail in Section 4.

Testing the policy scenarios against the contextual scenarios

Finally, the ACVZ also assessed how future-proof the three policy scenarios are based on the four contextual scenarios. This was done by answering the following questions:

- To what extent can the policy scenario be realised within the contextual scenario?
- What are the strong points and weak points of this combination?
- To what extent can the scenario be adjusted in order to resolve the weak points?

In order to answer these questions, the ACVZ organised two meetings, the results of which were incorporated into the assessment process. The results of these tests can be found in Section 5. Section 6 contains a brief summary of the findings and gives a rough outline of the results of the scenario study.

1.4 User instructions for this futures study

The trend analysis (Section 2) serves as background information, providing a summary of the context within which migration takes place and migration policy is developed.

The contextual scenarios (Section 3) should not be considered predictions of the future; they are simply tools for systematically examining what the future may have in store and what kind of migration policy could be developed in the event that such future situations arise. The ACVZ itself used the contextual scenarios for this very purpose in Section 5, in which the four contextual scenarios are used to assess how future-proof the three formulated policy scenarios are. The contextual scenarios can therefore be used by others in the same way.

The policy scenarios in Section 4 are written from three different normative perspectives and therefore involve value judgements, are not 'objective' and do

not necessarily represent the vision of the ACVZ. The policy scenarios offer insight into the range of possible future situations that are considered desirable, with regard to the issue of migration policy and what policy would be required in order to bring about these situations. Section 4 also contains numerous concrete proposals for possible policy measures.

In Section 5, the ACVZ gives insight into how future-proof the policy scenarios are and makes recommendations for possible amendments to these policy scenarios.

The final section consists of a summary of the preceding sections and gives conclusions that transcend the individual scenarios and are therefore more generally applicable.

These conclusions are mainly based on the findings in Section 2 and Section 5. Here, the ACVZ specifies the spheres of activity that will have to be put on the agenda in the years to come at the very least, regardless of the regulatory frameworks or what the future may hold.

¹ Parliamentary Papers II, 2015/16, 19 637, No. 2216.

<https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/blg-776316>

² In 2015, 662,000 migrants from other EU Member States were living in the Netherlands. <https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/maatwerk/2017/06/migrantenmonitor-2014-2015>, table 2.

³ Circular migration is a form of temporary migration in which the migrant returns to their country of origin or circulates between their host country and country of origin.

⁴ More information on the methods for conducting futures studies can be found in the WRR publication *Uit Zicht: toekomstverkennen met beleid* [Out of Sight: Exploring Futures for Policymaking], 2010.

⁵ Examples could include a deadly global epidemic or a third world war.

⁶ By the term 'black swan', Taleb means unexpected or accidental events that could substantially change our lives, such as the attacks of September 11 or the invention of the Internet.

⁷ This approach differs from most scenario studies, in which the other uncertain factors would also have been used as variables. If this approach had been adopted for this study, there would also have been – for example – a Global scenario with many climate migrants, many conflicts and low economic growth, as opposed to the current situation in which both Global scenarios are based on few climate migrants, fewer conflicts and high economic growth. The only variable factor on the x-axis is 'social cohesion'.

⁸ See subsection 2.1, which explains why, in practice, it is not always easy to distinguish between the two types of factors.



Section 2

Trend analysis



2.1 Introduction

This trend analysis focuses on the exogenous factors that will affect the development of a future-proof migration system. The ACVZ selected and qualified these factors by means of a survey and a workshop.⁹ The trend analysis lays the foundations for the contextual scenarios, which are described in the following section.


The distinction between exogenous migration management factors and factors under the Dutch government's control is not always easy to make. There is a grey area consisting of partly exogenous factors, some aspects of which can be controlled and some of which cannot. Within this futures study, the ACVZ has placed two factors in this grey zone. The first of these two factors is the EU. As an EU Member State, the Netherlands has some influence within the EU and sometimes succeeds in making its mark, as it did regarding the EU-Turkey deal for Syrian refugees. However, the influence of the Netherlands is sometimes also very limited, as it is just one of 28 Member States.

Developments within the EU are therefore only featured in the contextual scenarios in a general sense (strong EU/weak EU). The policy scenarios make reference to EU legislation and propose EU legislation to improve the migration system both in the Netherlands and across the entire EU.

Social cohesion is the other factor that has been placed in the grey zone, as cohesion within any society can only be engineered to a certain extent. It is unrealistic to believe that social cohesion can be easily and directly boosted via government policy, although the government certainly does have some degree of influence in this regard. For example, instruments such as labour market policy, integration policy and changes to social security can be implemented in order to enlarge cohesion within society. Furthermore, government policy can also indirectly or unintentionally have a positive or negative impact on social cohesion.

The exogenous factors are divided into a number of categories. Firstly, we discuss the exogenous factors that are expected to influence potential migration to Europe and the Netherlands in the period up to 2030 (so-called 'driving forces'). We then address the question of whether – and if so, to what extent – there is a need for migrants within Dutch society. Finally, we address the political and institutional capacity to execute migration policy at the national, EU and international levels.

Figure 2: Exogenous Migration Management Factors



2.2 Driving forces

The potential for migration to Europe and the Netherlands between now and 2030 will largely depend on the following factors: climate change, conflicts, socioeconomic development in Africa and Asia and population growth in Africa and Asia. In this study, these are defined as the driving factors of migration to the Netherlands.¹⁰

The four factors also mutually affect one another. For example:

- Armed conflict increases the vulnerability of communities to the effects of global warming.
- Shortages of natural resources can result in socioeconomic malaise and conflicts.
- In the long term, socioeconomic development can result in lower birth rates, and therefore reduces population size.

Below, the driving forces and their relevance to the issue of migration are discussed individually, taking into account any mutual cohesion between them.

2.2.1 Climate change

Among climate scientists, there is a practically unanimous consensus that the Earth is warming up (IPCC, 2014). People and communities who are already vulnerable are facing an even greater risk of being affected by climate change, for example in the form of drought, flooding and failed harvests (IPCC, 2014, p. 6).

Effect on migration

Little is known about the effects of climate change on migration. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), no reliable statistics are available regarding the expected number of climate migrants in the next 15 years, so the IOM does not provide any definitive conclusions regarding this matter (IOM, 2014). Prognoses vary between 25 million to 1 billion climate migrants by 2050, with the figure of 200 million being most frequently cited.¹¹20 For the purposes of comparison, UN figures say that, in 2015, the total number of migrants worldwide was 224 million and the total number of refugees over 20 million.¹²

Many factors complicate accurate forecasting of the future number of climate migrants. Firstly, various driving factors of migration are interconnected. Climate change can result in food shortages, which constitute a major driver of migration on their own and even more so when these shortages result in conflicts. Secondly, the question of whether gradual climate change results in migration depends significantly on the context within which the climate change manifests itself. For example, if climate change goes hand in hand with falling income levels in large parts of the world, it is conceivable that levels of international migration will go down because fewer people will have the funds necessary to migrate. Also, when realistic solutions are found to deal with climate change issues, large scale migration can be prevented.

Furthermore, planned migration can even be an effective method of successfully mitigating the effects of climate change. It was with this latter goal in mind that the Nansen Initiative¹³ was set up in 2011, an interstate consultative process supported by the IOM and the UNHCR to discuss the issue of international migration caused by climate change (UNHCR, 2015). In addition, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has explicitly included planned migration in its plan of action since 2010. The UNHCR coordinates the 'Advisory Group on Human Mobility and Climate Change' (UNHCR, 2015).

A greater quantity of reliable information can be found on the issue of migration stemming from sudden climate change-related disasters. This type of migration is usually temporary and predominantly takes place within the country of origin or within the same region. The numbers for this are substantial: in 2014, approximately 17.5 million people were forced to seek refuge due to weather-related disasters such as hurricanes and flooding (IOM and SciencesPo, 2015).




Influxes of climate change migrants can be local, regional or international, although most empirical research shows that internal migration – such as urbanisation – and displacement into neighbouring countries are expected to account for the overwhelming majority of associated migration figures.

2.2.2. Conflicts


Few articles have been published regarding whether the number of conflicts will increase or decrease in the future.¹⁴ After the Cold War ended, the number of conflicts progressively declined, although an upward trend re-established itself between 2004 and 2015 in both the number of conflicts and the number of deaths in war, until a slight decline in 2016.¹⁵ In the 21st century, there has been a particular increase in 'internationalised armed conflicts', conflicts in which foreign powers intervene in an internal conflict in another country. This type of conflict is more difficult to resolve than conflicts with no international dimension (Pettersen & Wallensteen).

Figure 3: Number of Wars, 1945–2015



Source: Pettersen, T. & Wallensteen, P. (2015). Armed conflicts, 1946–2014, in *Journal of Peace Research*. Volume 52 (4), p. 536-550.

Figure 4: Estimated Number of War-related Deaths, 1989–2014



Source: Petterson, T. & Wallensteen, P. (2015). Armed conflicts, 1946–2014, in *Journal of Peace Research*. Volume 52 (4), p. 536-550.

Based on a statistical model, scientists at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) have projected that the number of countries suffering from an internal armed conflict (a civil war) will decline in the future and that, by 2050, the number of countries in conflict situations will fall by half compared to 2010 (Hegre, Karlsen, Nygard, Havard, & Urdal, 2013).

As Figure 3 shows, civil wars have been the most common type of conflict since the Second World War. This projection is based on data from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset in combination with projections made by bodies such as the UN regarding numerous factors that have historically contributed to the outbreak or reduction of conflict situations.

These factors are as follows:

- region: research shows that internal conflicts have a cross-border 'spill-over' effect, including when corrected for other risk factors such as poverty. Countries bordering a country in conflict run a greater risk of descending into conflict themselves;
- population level: countries with large populations (in absolute terms) run a greater risk of internal conflict than countries with small populations;
- education: higher rates of literacy, primary school attendance among both girls and boys and secondary school attendance among boys correlate to a smaller number of conflicts;
- population age: when young people make up a large proportion of the population, the country runs a greater risk of low-intensity armed conflicts;

- infant mortality: there is a strong positive correlation between infant mortality and armed conflict;
- oil: countries with large oil stocks are at greater risk of armed conflict;
- ethnic dominance: if a particular ethnic group constitutes a dominant majority, then there is a greater risk of armed conflict in the country.

A more recent publication (partly by the same authors) summarises that, in previous conflict studies, the factors found to correlate the strongest with internal conflicts are a history of previous conflicts and a large population with low socioeconomic development (Hegre, et al.). Among other factors, a strong economy leads to networks of economic dependence between groups, which in turn results in fewer conflicts. Other socioeconomic factors that the authors of this article report as having a pacifying effect include the number of children attending school, the education budget and literacy levels among the population.

The article also states it is possible that poor economic conditions in combination with population growth in the years to come could lead to an increase in the number of conflicts. Using a statistical model, the writers tested five different future socioeconomic scenarios and their influence on the likelihood of internal conflicts. The scenarios in which high investment was made in broad social development were associated with the highest decrease in the risk of internal conflicts, particularly in the least developed countries. In the article, developments were also tested in combination with climate change, the conclusion of which was that a sustainable development scenario involving the lowest number of challenges caused by climate change offers the same chance of peace as a conventional development model.

Effect on migration

Conflicts, violence, threats to personal security (actual or perceived), political instability and human rights violations serve as strong motivators of migration depending on the context in which they occur. The literature also shows that, when it comes to forced migration, it is difficult to separate political from economic factors, as there is a strong correlation between political and economic instability. If a conscious decision to migrate has been made, then the availability of a network can motivate the choice of a particular destination country. However, if people are fleeing, then the choice of destination country often involves random chance or is determined by human smugglers, and the destination can even change during the journey. The routes taken by these refugees and/or migrants and their motivations differ greatly and are subject to change en route. To a large degree, the group of forced migrants is heterogeneous, which makes it difficult to generalise them (EASO, 2016).


UNHCR statistics show that, in absolute figures, there has never been a higher number of people displaced as a result of persecution, conflict, violence or human rights violations: 65.6 million in 2016, of which 22.5 million were

refugees, 2.8 million asylum seekers and 40.3 million displaced within their own country (UNHCR, 2017).

2.2.3 Socioeconomic developments in Africa and Asia

In the period leading up to 2030, the economies in South-East Asia and Africa are expected to continue to grow at an above-average rate. According to the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)¹⁶ the expected average growth for China in the period until 2030 is 6.7%, with 6.2% for India and 5.4% for sub-Saharan Africa (CEPS, 2013).¹⁷ This means that, by 2030, the economies of China and India will be nearly three times as large as in 2014 and the economies in Africa will be twice as large.¹⁸

Figure 5: Comparison of the Growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) according to Purchasing Power Parity, 2010–2030




Source: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), *The Global Economy in 2030, Trends and Strategies for Europe* (2013), p. 62.

These differences in growth figures mean that the contributions to global GDP of the EU, the US and Japan will decline further in the period until 2030 and that the proportion of global GDP produced by China, India and sub-Saharan Africa will increase further.



Figure 6: Regional Proportion of Global GDP (according to Purchasing Power Parity)



Source: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), *The Global Economy in 2030, Trends and Strategies for Europe*, (2013), p. 64.

Despite these high growth figures, individual prosperity in Asia and Africa in 2030 will still be significantly lower than in Europe. According to the projection models, GDP per head of population in 2030 will be \$37,000 in the EU, \$24,000 in China, \$10,000 in North Africa, \$8,000 in India and \$4,000 in sub-Saharan Africa (CEPS, 2013, p. 63).

There is uncertainty regarding the speed at which the economies in South-East Asia and Africa will grow. The OECD points to the fact that the difference in economic growth between OECD and non-OECD countries since 2009 is decreasing, particularly due to the reduced growth figures of China, Brazil and the Russian Federation (OECD, 2016, pp. 54-57). However, according to the CEPS, only an economic decline on massive scale or an abrupt drop in production growth could stop the growth figures of the developing countries from exceeding those in Europe (CEPS, 2013, p. 66).

In addition to economic growth, other socioeconomic developments within the country of origin also affect levels of migration, such as labour market policy, education and social services. The effect on migration levels of public investment in these areas in migrants' countries of origin is discussed below.

Effect on migration

Expectations are that income disparity between different countries will decline and that many countries will develop from low-income countries to middle-

income countries, which will result in an increase in the middle class. This should result in less economic and political tension around the world (CEPS, 2013, p. 72). As described in the subsection on 'Conflicts', conflicts are a significant driving force behind migration and a reduction in conflicts due to economic growth could therefore result in less forced migration.

On the other hand, migration studies show that economic growth and an increase in the middle class will initially result in an increase in migration, as a certain level of funds is necessary to be able to migrate (OECD, 2016) (Haas, 2011, p. 19). Recent research by the OECD shows that, in the period from 1995–2015, the percentage of migrants from countries that had enjoyed sustained economic growth¹⁹ to high income countries increased. According to the OECD, the reason for this is that income disparity between different countries remains high and that increased income gives people the opportunity to put their migration plans into action. The CEPS indicates that income disparity of at least 30 to 40% between the country of origin and the destination country makes migration more attractive. This means that, by 2030, the income disparity between the EU and many parts of the world will still be great enough to make the EU attractive to migrants.

In addition, people who attended post-secondary education are three to four times more likely to migrate than people who did not, the main reason for which is that many high-income countries operate attractive migration policy for highly trained migrants. The higher a country's percentage of residents who attended post-secondary education, the higher the potential level of emigration (OECD, 2016, p. 115). The OECD therefore expects the trend of increasing migration from developing economies to OECD countries to continue in the years to come.

The OECD also pays attention to the effect of government policy (in sectors such as the labour market, social security and education) in countries of origin on migration (OECD, 2016, pp. 141-150) (OECD, 2017). As yet, little research has been conducted in this area and the interconnections are often complex and dependent on the context within which the policy interventions in question are implemented. Labour market policy that creates jobs and develops employment programmes and a government that funds work agencies that help people find jobs can help to reduce emigration levels. On the other hand, investment in professional training can actually increase emigration, as it raises people's education level, which in turn boosts their opportunities on the international labour market.

According to the OECD, poor quality education in countries of origin and education that is ill suited to the labour market are a significant push factor for migration. The same applies to expensive education. Many parents are willing to migrate if it means their children will be guaranteed better education or if it will allow them to fund their children's education in the country of origin.




Investments in better and cheaper education in countries of origin can reduce migration, although cheaper education can also mean people have more money to spend, actually giving them sufficient funds to migrate.

Finally, the OECD study shows that public spending in the social domain in countries of origin can reduce their emigration rates and that people with permanent employment contracts are less likely to make migration plans than people who do not have permanent employment. However, a completely opposite trend can also be observed in some countries, where the number of people making plans to migrate is increasing as the level of social security increases. Marginalised people with no access to healthcare are less likely to harbour migration plans than people who do have access to these kinds of services.

2.2.4 Population growth in Africa and Asia

The UN estimates that, in the period 2017–2030, the global population will grow by 1 billion people (from 7.6 billion to around 8.6 billion.) (United Nations Population Division, 2017). The biggest relative growth will take place in Africa, where the population will have increased by around 448 million to around 1.7 billion by 2030. Of this total, approximately 818 million people will be in the productive age group (20–64 years), compared to a figure of around 540 million in 2015 (an increase of 278 million).²⁰ In Asia, the total population is expected to grow by approximately 443 million to nearly 5 billion. Around 3 billion of these people will be in the productive age group of 20–64 years, compared to 2.65 billion in 2015. In this period, the population of Europe will stabilise at around 740 million.

Figure 7: Expected Population Growth (in Millions) of Africa, Asia and Europe, 2015–2030 (according to the Medium Variant Projection)



Source: United Nations Population Division (2017). World Population Prospects 2017. Data files: probabilistic population projections based on the World Population Prospects, table total population. New York: United Nations.
<https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Download/Probabilistic/Population/>

The figures in this subsection are based on the medium variant projection, but also the high and low variant projections predict population growth in Africa in the period between now and 2030.²¹ There is no doubt that the population of both continents will grow, although the growth may be greater or less than the figures presented here.

Effect on migration

There is no consensus among scientists regarding the relationship between population growth and migration. Some studies identify population growth or density as an important determinant of emigration, while others say that population growth or density is only a relevant factor when it is combined with other macro or meso factors such as economic growth, job opportunities in the country of origin or migration policy in the destination country (EASO, 2016). Indeed, research by the OECD has shown that, in the period 1995–2015, job growth failed to keep up with the growth in the professional population (OECD, 2016, p. 116).

There is a similar lack of consensus regarding the effect of the proportion of young adults in the overall population of countries of origin on migration rates. Some academics believe this to be a significant explanatory factor, while others say this is only the case when combined with a lack of economic prospects. This explains why migration from the Gulf States has not increased despite a strong population growth, as well as why it has increased from Eastern European countries, whose economies are stagnating and whose birth rates are low (EASO, 2016).



2.3 Demand within Dutch society

In the first section of this trend analysis, we discussed the driving forces that will determine the levels of migration to the EU and to the Netherlands in the period between now and 2030. The second question relevant to any futures study into migration management is how great the need for migration will be within Dutch society in order to maintain a healthy economy. Three strongly interconnected factors are particularly relevant to this issue: economic growth, innovation and population ageing. We will first discuss these factors separately before addressing the effect of their mutual interaction on migration levels.

2.3.1 Economic growth

The Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (Centraal Planbureau, CPB), has developed two reference scenarios relating to the macroeconomy in 2030. They distinguish between high and low development of GDP, labour productivity and job opportunities in 2030 (and 2050). In the 'high' scenario, the potential population size increases to such an extent that job opportunities per head are still increasing. In the 'low' scenario, this is not the case, and job opportunities will decrease from 2030 onwards. Based on the available data and qualitative arguments/narratives within scientific literature, the CPB expects GDP growth of 2% per year in the 'high' scenario and 1% per year in the 'low' scenario.

In the period from 1980 until the economic crisis in 2008, average economic growth in the Netherlands was 2.6% per year, which is significantly higher than the growth in the 'high' scenario. According to the CPB, the population growth slowing down and the increase in population ageing will mean that, despite the higher pensionable age, the potential professional population will grow less rapidly than in the past, which will hamper the development of GDP (CPB & PBL, 2015, pp. 26-27).

2.3.2 Innovation

The Dutch economy has a reputation for innovation and it is our ambition to maintain and build upon this reputation wherever possible.²² According to the Advisory Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (Adviesraad voor Wetenschap, Technologie en Innovatie, AWTI), it is essential that the Netherlands invest more in the internationalisation of science, technology and innovation (known as Science, Technology and Innovation Diplomacy) (AWTI, 2017). In October 2016, the Socioeconomic Council (Sociaal Economische Raad, SER) published the exploratory investigation 'Mens en technologie, samen aan het werk' [Humans and technology working together], (SER, 2016) in which it gives advice to the government about the transition to a digital economy, also known as the 'fourth industrial revolution'. The study recommends further development and broader application of ICT in close connection with other forms of technology. According to the SER, digitisation is changing how employment

and employment opportunities are organised. Digitisation creates opportunities, as it enables new products and services in all kinds of sectors that can contribute to increasing social prosperity, although it also involves substantial shifts in production processes and structures, meaning it can have significant consequences for both employers and employees. According to the SER, the Netherlands is relatively well prepared for the fourth industrial revolution, although the shortage of ICT professionals is a problem.

Other critical points include the need for sustained investment in infrastructure, increasing cyber threats and the fact that the Netherlands is lagging behind regarding how efficiently ICT investments are converted into productivity and contribute to sustained economic growth.


Since the beginning of the 20th century, there has been constant speculation regarding whether technological development will increase or decrease the number of available jobs. At the macro level, there are a range of different perspectives regarding this issue. According to the first, technology has a net positive effect: innovation results in economic growth, job creation and an acceptable distribution of wealth. The second view is that technology results in a downward spiral: innovation results in higher labour productivity and therefore fewer jobs and a disproportionate distribution of wealth.²³ According to the SER, the issues of the modern era are concentrated on how we create a vision of work for all and ensure that everyone shares in the greater prosperity.

2.3.3 Ageing

According to projections by Statistics Netherlands, the rate of population ageing will increase further in the period up to 2030. The number of people aged 65 and over is expected to rise from approximately 3.2 million in 2017 to over 4.2 million by around 2030, with the increase in population ageing expected to continue until 2042. In the same period, the number of people aged between 20 and 64 is expected to decline slightly, going from approximately 10 million now to around 9.7 million in 2030.²⁴ This means the 'grey pressure' (the ratio of people aged 65 and over to people aged 20–64) is expected to be 43.4% by 2030.



Figure 8: Projected Population of the Netherlands according to Age, 2017–2030



Source: Statistics Netherlands Statline. Key figures of various population projections and observations

The level of 'grey pressure' in the Netherlands is currently below the EU average (over 26% versus 28%, figures from 2014). The highest levels of 'grey pressure' in the EU can be found in Germany, Greece and Italy, with Poland and Ireland having the lowest (CBS, 2016, p. 63).

Effect on migration

As discussed earlier in the subsection on 'Economic growth in Africa and Asia', income disparity between countries is a strong motivator of migration. The fact that the Netherlands is a high-income country and will remain so until at least 2030 means it will remain an attractive destination country for migrants from developing countries and countries with up-and-coming economies.

In addition, a question highly relevant to the issue of migration is how much demand for labour the expected economic growth and population ageing will create and what proportion of this demand can solely be met by migrants. The answer to this question is closely interconnected with the question regarding to what extent innovation is changing the labour market.

It is a widely held belief that ageing will cause a shortage on the labour market that can only be resolved by labour migration from countries with more youthful populations. However, according to the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), this issue is more complex than people often think (WRR, 2012). As explained above, the labour market and the need for employees is always changing due to factors such as globalisation and technological developments.

Research by the WRR shows that, relatively often, senior citizens practise professions in which the workforce is declining while young people relatively frequently find work in completely new segments of the labour market.

The aforementioned report by the SER clearly shows that digitisation of society will have substantial consequences for the Dutch labour market, although it does not say anything about whether these changes will cause the Netherlands' demand for labour migrants to increase or decrease. According to the WRR, answering this question will require further knowledge about how new jobs and tasks are appearing on and disappearing from the labour market within an increasingly globalised economy (Schrijvers & Kremer, 2013). Due to the digitisation of society, there is extreme uncertainty regarding whether and what kind of migrants will be required in the years to come in order to satisfy demand on the Dutch labour market.

However, in addition to simply 'filling the gap', migrants can also be useful in that they can add innovation to the economy and create extra jobs. The WRR points to the fact that diversity and 'cognitive distance' can be extremely important for innovation, as they enable new combinations (WRR, 2008). Cognitive distance does create problems due to people understanding each other less, but it also offers opportunities, as resolving these differences is a great learning opportunity. Within this vision, innovation is promoted by finding a balance between similarities and differences. The cognitive distance must be large enough for the parties to learn from each other, but small enough to ensure they understand each other.

In addition to liberalisation of trade, the WRR also believes that migration of employees to new working environments at both the national and international level is of great importance to innovation. The Advisory Council for Science, Technology and Innovation also generally recognises

'(...) that attracting, developing and keeping hold of talented highly skilled workers is an increasingly decisive factor for a country's innovative capacity, as this ensures a knowledge-intensive economy, for example by attracting businesses to establish themselves there and to ensure the cultural flexibility that is essential for a society to operate internationally.' (AWTI, 2017, p. 20)

Innovation is an extremely high priority to the European Commission, and in some cases, the EC draws a connection between the issues of innovation and attracting innovative migrants, by means of the 'Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan', for example, which showcases the creative and innovative impulses that entrepreneurs from third countries have to offer.²⁵ The conclusion is that a certain degree of migration is useful in order to maintain and further develop innovative economies and that foreign entrepreneurs can create extra jobs.



2.4 Scope for policy

Firstly, the institutional and political scope for conducting a Dutch migration policy is restricted by international developments. For this reason, during the first stage of the study, in which the relevant developments were identified and analysed,²⁶ the ACVZ determined developments within the EU, globalisation and international cooperation to be relevant to this study. Secondly, migration policy has to take into account the political scope concerning the interaction between migration and other aspects of Dutch society. In this regard, the ACVZ has identified social cohesion in the Netherlands as a crucial factor (WRR, 2017, p. 20).²⁷ In the following subsections, we will first address the international dimension before examining the issue of social cohesion in the Netherlands.

2.4.1 Globalisation, developments in the international legal order and international cooperation

At this juncture, the issues of globalisation, the international legal order and international cooperation will be handled separately. The reason for this is that many different definitions of globalisation exist and it is vital that the various factors involved in this issue be clearly and accurately distinguished. Some definitions of globalisation are so broad that they can also include developments in the international legal order and international cooperation. For example, the CEPS definition of globalisation is

'the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual' (CEPS, 2013, p. 23).²⁸

However, there are also definitions that give the term a more limited and predominantly economic scope. The Dutch-language Wikipedia page defines it as follows:

'Globalisation is the constant process of economic, political and cultural integration, the core aspect of which is global division of labour and the worldwide expansion of production lines driven by information and communication technology and international trade. Globalisation is made possible by developments in the transport and telecommunications sectors and it is characterised by extensive expansion of scale, the creation of global capitalism and the spread of a consumer culture' (Translation of the Dutch version of the Wikipedia page).

There are many connections between this narrow definition of the term and the development of the international legal order and international cooperation.

Globalisation increases the need to set international rules and make international agreements, although this can also limit the globalisation process. Below, we will first discuss the purely economic meaning of the term, followed by the international legal order and international cooperation.

Globalisation

Projections by the OECD and the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) (ESPAS, 2015) indicate that growth in global trade of goods will decrease in the years to come, although it will still remain an important factor. However, the growth in global trade of services and global investment could speed up. ESPAS and the CEPS expect that, in the period between now and 2030, there will be three key players in the globalisation process: China, the US and the EU, with the main role shifting to China in the years to come.

However, the free market ideology and the resulting globalisation process have come under serious pressure in recent years, culminating in the Brexit vote and growing resistance to free trade agreements such as TTIP, among others. On this matter, the Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad reports the following:

'According to political economist Dani Rodrik, the modern international economy is forcing countries to choose between participation in globalisation, national sovereignty and democracy. No country can have more than two of these factors at the same time. Continued participation in ever-deeper economic integration means nation states must agree increasingly extensive common rules and standards at the government level, which makes the population feel they are not being recognised or listened to. If this is not achievable, then national sovereignty must be relinquished in order to maintain democratic sovereignty, although this will be raised up to the level of a supranational federation(...). Those who wish to retain both national sovereignty and national democracy will have to withdraw from economic integration. Brexit is the consequence of this dilemma.'²⁹

During the course of this debate, Branko Milanovic's 'elephant chart' gained notoriety, which showed that middle-income earners in the West are the 'losers of globalisation' and therefore have a very good reason to oppose it. This could result in increasing political preference for restrictive migration policy.



Figure 9: Global Income Growth in 1988–2008 (in %), Corrected for Disparity in Purchasing Power



Source: The American Prospect, using data provided by Branko Milanovic

The graph has also drawn criticism. If you adjust the graph for population growth and the substantial influence of the populations of China and India, then the 'losses' suffered by the middle class of rich countries become relatively minor.³⁰

International legal order and international cooperation

The Netherlands is party to an extensive range of international treaties that establish frameworks within which Dutch migration policy must operate. The most important of these are the Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In recent years, the interpretation and tenability of the Refugee Convention has been a subject of discussion, due to factors such as the Syrian refugee crisis and the pressure that this exerted on Syria's neighbours and the EU. It is now being said that the Convention, which dates back to 1951, is no longer fit for modern purposes (Betts & Collier, 2017). The discussion also focuses strongly on the uneven distribution of refugees across the world and on the fact that, in order to migrate, they usually have to turn to human smugglers due to the lack of legal migration channels. As a result of these concerns, a UN summit was held on 19 September 2016, the first ever to be held solely on the issue of refugees and migrants. This summit culminated in the signing of the New York Declaration,³¹ in which Member States promised to improve support to countries hit hardest by refugee flows, develop an instrument for handling substantial refugee flows and find new homes for all people recognised as refugees by the UNHCR. To underline the importance of a global approach to migration, it was decided at this summit to make the IOM part of the UN system. At the conference, participants expressed a desire to develop

a global 'compact' to promote safe, orderly and regular migration (the Global Compact for Migration), to be adopted in September 2018, and a 'compact' for a more evenly balanced migration distribution system for distributing responsibilities concerning the reception and support of refugees (the Global Compact on Refugees). As mentioned earlier in the 'Climate' subsection, planned migration (including climate migration) has been explicitly included in the UNFCCC's action plans since 2010 (UNHCR, 2015).

Asylum migration is not the only area in which international developments play out. As a result of global competition for highly qualified migrants, a consequence of globalisation, deregulation processes have been initiated for certain groups of migrants as well as processes to streamline regulations governing commercial interests and the interests of transnationally operating businesses (Goldin, Cameron, & Balajaran, 2011). For example, the World Trade Organisation (WTO)³² and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)³³ have created a regime to enable the presence of service suppliers (Mode 3) and natural persons (Mode 4).

Legislation governing family migration also has an international dimension. Dutch family migration legislation is largely determined by human rights conventions such as the ECHR, which establishes the right to a private life and the right to family life.

Effect on migration

The aforementioned trends influence the government's capacity to execute migration policy in a variety of ways. In a general sense, globalisation means that, in order for countries to compete, they must keep their economies open, not only to trade and investment, but also to migration. According to James Hollifield (Hollifield, 2004) this means that states are trapped in a 'liberal paradox'. Unlike the movement of goods, capital and services, the movement of people involves major political risks. He therefore describes the rise of the 'migration state' in the 20th and 21st centuries, in which regulation of international migration is as important as national security and economic prosperity. However, until now, nation states have not been successful in mutually organising international migration, and it remains predominantly an EU and/or national policy area. It is possible that the aforementioned initiatives by the WTO and GATS will provide an impulse to develop an international framework for labour migration, Due to the influence of digitisation, however, it is conceivable that globalisation could continue even without an increase in migration, as it is removing the need for physical movement of people in order to perform labour. Furthermore, if protectionism increases in the future and globalisation reduces, then it is conceivable that this will result in less migration, although a rise in unregulated migration is also possible in the event of a lack of legal migration opportunities.



The Refugee Convention does not yet provide a mechanism for evenly distributing refugees across the world or to allow asylum seekers to travel safely and legally to other countries to request protection. Asylum migration to Europe and the Netherlands is conducted almost exclusively by unregulated means. If the developments in the international legal order explained above results in the UN successfully implementing a global system of refugee distribution and climate migration, then this will enable legal asylum migration to Europe. However, this would not resolve the problem of unregulated migration of economic migrants, e.g. the current flow from West Africa.

In addition to asylum and labour migration, the globalisation process also affects family migration. It is likely that the globalisation process will lead to an increase in the number of families with family members living in another country and/or holding a different nationality to other members of the family.

In many OECD countries, at least 10% of the marriages are between a citizen³⁴ and a foreign national (OECD, 2017). Frequently, too little attention is paid to the issue of family migration despite family migrants constituting a substantial proportion of global migration. In 2015, approximately 40% of migrants to OECD countries were family migrants and 25 to 50% of people in OECD countries who were born in a different country (known as the country's 'migrant stock') originally came to the country as a family migrant (OECD, 2017). In 2015, the year in which there was a substantive debate about the increased flow of asylum seekers, the number of people registered as family migrants with Dutch municipalities was nearly twice as high as the number of people registered as refugees.³⁵ A large proportion of family migration concerns 'chain migration', i.e. a migrant who moves to the Netherlands for employment or asylum purposes and then brings his or her family members to the Netherlands as well. Dutch citizens who bring foreign partners to the Netherlands also contribute to the number of family migrants.

2.4.2 The European Union

Article 79(1) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states that

'The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings.'

Therefore, membership of the EU means that, to a large extent, Dutch migration policy is determined by European rules (Union law), which are established within EU directives and regulations.

As early as 1999, the Member States of the EU signed the Treaty of Amsterdam, pledging to work together towards a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Since then, directives have been developed governing the asylum procedure (2013/32), the assessment of asylum requests (2011/95) and the reception of asylum seekers (2013/33). An EU Regulation is in force to determine which Member State is responsible for processing an asylum application (Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, known as the Dublin Regulation). A number of proposals are currently under consideration that would replace the aforementioned regulations with directives in order to facilitate harmonisation of asylum policy.³⁶ As a result of the Syrian refugee crisis in 2015–2016, the EU has already taken the first steps towards redistribution of asylum seekers across the Member States.³⁷

Furthermore, a number of regulations are in force governing labour and family migration: the Family Reunification Directive (2003/86), the Single Permit Directive (2011/98), the EU Blue Card Directive (2009/50) for highly qualified migrants, the Directive for students and researchers (2016/801), an intra-corporate transfers Directive (2014/66) for third-country nationals, the Seasonal Workers Directive (2014/36) and the Directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents (2003/109). In order to punish illegal employment of foreign nationals without legal residence status, there is the Employers' Sanctions Directive (2009/52). There is also the Residence Permit for Victims of Human Trafficking Directive (2004/81/EC), and the Schengen Borders Code (Regulation (EU) 2016/399) and the Return Directive (2008/115) to control border security and return.

Membership of the EU also entails free movement of EU citizens, as stipulated in Articles 45 to 62 of the TFEU and the Citizens' Rights Directive (2004/38), as a result of which many citizens from other EU Member States have settled in the Netherlands, and many Dutch people have settled in other EU Member States. In 2015, 662,000 people from other EU Member States were living in the Netherlands.³⁸

Following the Euro crisis, the refugee crisis and the Brexit referendum, the EU faced a crossroads, with many political parties in national parliaments promising to pull out of the EU. In response to the crisis, the European Commission presented five scenarios based on which the Member States could express their preferred future of the EU. These scenarios are:

- *Carrying On*
The EU27 focuses on delivering its positive reform agenda.
- *Nothing but the Single Market*
The EU27 gradually re-centres on the single market as the 27 Member States are not able to find common ground on an increasing number of policy areas.
- *Those Who Want More Do More*



The EU27 proceeds as today but allows willing Member States to do more together in specific areas such as defence, internal security or social matters.

- *Doing Less More Efficiently*
The EU27 focuses on delivering more and faster in selected policy areas, while doing less where it is perceived not to have an added value.
- *Doing Much More Together*
Member States decide to share more power, resources and decision-making across the board.³⁹

Effect on migration

In the years to come, the decisions that must be made by the EU as a whole and the Netherlands as a Member State regarding the future of the EU will determine the Dutch government's capacity to implement both EU migration policy (and related policy areas) and Dutch migration policy. It is possible that the EU will take more of a back seat in the future, although a more intensive role for the EU is also a conceivable future scenario. Developments at the time of writing suggest the latter scenario is more likely.

2.4.3 Social cohesion within Dutch society

During the first phase of the study, the ACVZ defined social cohesion within Dutch society as one of the crucial exogenous factors. Social cohesion is defined as a 'mutual feeling of connectedness, solidarity and trust'. In our democratic system, the political framework within which migration policy can be formulated is determined to a significant extent by the degree to which the feeling of social cohesion extends to refugees and migrants or is threatened by their arrival. Sociocultural developments and the continued existence of the welfare state (and concerns about its continued existence) play a central role in the migration debate in the Netherlands. These issues are discussed below.

Sociocultural developments

In their publication 'Gescheiden werelden? Een verkenning van sociaal-culturele tegenstellingen in Nederland' [Separate worlds? An exploratory study of sociocultural contradictions in the Netherlands], the WRR and the SCP argue that the debate is not polarised within Dutch society, although there is definitely a spectrum of opinions on the matter, with two distinct groups – referred to in the report as the universalists and the particularists – on the far sides of this spectrum. The majority of the population is somewhere in between these two extremes and often displays some traits of one group and some of the other. Views concerning migration play an important role in defining this spectrum:

'The universalists are people who are quite positive regarding open borders, different cultures and admittance of immigrants. In this respect,

you could call them universalists, as they have a more universal view with regard to justice and citizenship.' (SCP;WRR, 2014, p. 18).

'The members of the other group primarily draw attention to the disadvantages of open borders and immigration. You could call them particularists, as they have a more local and particularist view of justice and citizenship. To them, not all world citizens are equal and the membership of local communities is a relevant factor in determining eligibility for rights and social services. They are more often "welfare chauvinists" and believe that social services should only be available to members of the national community.' (SCP;WRR, 2014, pp. 18-19).

The other characteristics of the two aforementioned groups on the far sides of the spectrum are displayed in the table below. From the perspective of migration management, it is particularly relevant that universalists are more pro-EU and particularists are more Eurosceptic.

Figure 10: The Divide in Dutch Opinions

Universalists		Particularists
Social and political views: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • integration; • pro-Europe; • non-confrontational; • politically trusting. 	_____	Social and political views: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • demarcation; • eurosceptic; • confrontational; • politically distrusting.
General views: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • more globally oriented; • reflexive communication style; • culturally secure; • socially trusting. 	_____	General views: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • more locally oriented; • direct communication style; • culturally insecure; • socially mistrusting.
Sociodemographics/media: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • more highly educated; • often live in cities; • media: more serious, more online. 	_____	Sociodemographics/media: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • less educated; • often do not live in cities; • media: more popular, more TV.

In accordance with: SCP; WRR: Gescheiden werelden, een verkenning van sociaal-culturele tegenstellingen in Nederland. [Separate worlds? An exploratory study of sociocultural contradictions in the Netherlands], 2014, p. 18.

In the futures study 'De toekomst tegemoet' [Facing the future], the SCP gives its opinions on what it believes the future state of social cohesion in the Netherlands will look like (SCP, 2016). The current trend is expected to continue, meaning that the number of connections we have – including via social media – will increase, although we will spend less time maintaining those connections. This expectation is based on the fact that the older generation will be replaced by a younger generation, the flexibility of the labour market is predicted to increase in the future and the growth in urbanisation is expected to continue. The SCP also expects that people's social relationships will be formed less and less in groups (e.g. sports clubs) and increasingly in networks whose make-up and structure will differ according to the activity performed or the interest promoted. These contacts are generally more superficial in nature, although, thanks to the



internet, people now have far greater opportunities to maintain their network, reconnect with old contacts and meet like-minded people. The SCP has also observed that contact with family members has remained equally as important and expects family relationships to become more important as family members become more dependent on each other (childcare, care for the elderly, etc.). The local environment is also expected to remain important to people.

According to the SCP, it is certain that social divides will exist in the future, as every society harbours forms of division. According to the institute, the relevant question in this regard is to what extent members of various population groups will still meet in the flesh and how they will behave around each other in public areas. The SCP expects these groups to interact in person less and less because:

- there will be fewer and fewer physical spaces in which the general public encounter each other (shops, neighbourhood cafés, etc.);
- there will be increasing spatial segregation (multi-ethnic, dynamic and highly qualified cities versus white, less qualified and rural areas with an older population);
- the digital environment is splitting into smaller segments;
- media consumption is diversifying.

The SCP therefore expects that the breeding ground for tension between groups will increase, although it is unwilling to predict whether these tensions will escalate. The SCP is pessimistic about how ethnic divides will develop in the future and also has concerns about the uneasiness among inhabitants in lower socioeconomic positions, which is further fuelled by the increasing uncertainty within their everyday life. The increasing distance between cities and peripheries could also be a source of the increasing inequality and the resulting unrest, although the report indicates that inhabitants can develop new social initiatives in order to redress this divide in society. Examples of this include the fact that the number of hours Dutch people spend on volunteer work has remained the same and that care and energy cooperatives have recently been initiated.

The migration-welfare state paradox

Within any futures study into migration management, the conflict (be it actual or perceived) between migration and the welfare state deserves attention. In the preceding text, we have already stated that opinions differ greatly regarding access to the welfare state in the Netherlands. At one end of the spectrum, you have the universalists, who have a more universal view of justice, and at the other end, you have the particularists, who think that social services should only be available to members of the national community. This is a conflict of normative values. Furthermore, there is also a feeling – regardless of its desirability or lack thereof – that unrestrained migration and the welfare state cannot coexist. After all, the welfare state is an institute that exists primarily

within national borders and is based on solidarity between the residents of that country, while migration is mainly transnational (Kremer, 2013, p. 8). The statement by Nobel Prize winner Milton Friedman is often cited in this context: 'it's just obvious that you can't have free immigration and a welfare state'.

One hypothesis is that the welfare state functions as a magnet for migrants, which could risk the strain on services becoming too great and causing the welfare state to be brought down by its own success. (Borjas, 1999) This theory was devised within the North American context and was subsequently investigated in the EU in relation to the freedom of movement of EU citizens. The study within the EU found some minor connections between the destination country chosen by migrants and the level of welfare state services in the destination country in question (De Giorgi & Pellizzari, 2009), although factors such as income levels, unemployment rates and the presence of fellow nationals had a much greater influence on the decision of where to go (Giulietti, 2014). Research by Kremer into labour migrants in the Netherlands shows that the availability of work is the most important motivator of migration, followed by stability and good quality of life (for more information on this matter, see subsection 2.2.3 'Socioeconomic developments in Africa and Asia'). Certainty of finding a job is also a far more important factor to less qualified labour migrants than the services offered by the welfare state (Kremer, 2013, p. 148). When choosing a country of destination, the standard of living in a general sense plays a role for migrants seeking asylum (EASO, 2016, p. 24). There is no consensus among scientists regarding the question of whether the services of the welfare state influence migrants' choice of destination country; some researchers found a strong link while others found none at all (EASO, 2016, pp. 29-30).

Another reason why many people believe migration and the welfare state are ill suited to each other is that immigrants and refugees make disproportionate use of the services of the welfare state, but have contributed less towards it. This can detract from the solidarity among the population, despite the fact that this is an essential factor in preserving the welfare state (Giulietti, 2014) (Kremer, 2013, p. 8). However, according to a 2013 study by Giulietti into migrants from both inside and outside the EU, this was only the case in a few EU Member States. In many other EU Member States, immigrants actually make less use of the welfare state than the population without a migrant background. Giulietti ascribes this underrepresentation to an information deficit among migrants, language problems, cultural and social values and discrimination. He also points to the fact that migrants must often live and work in a country for a number of years before becoming eligible for welfare. This study found no significant connection in the Netherlands between migration status and the use of social benefits (Giulietti, Guzi, & Kahanec, 2011).

A third problem is that ethnic diversity could put societal solidarity under pressure. In order to maintain solidarity, it is essential that people identify with one another. Once this is no longer the case, the willingness to contribute to the



welfare state is severely diminished (Kremer, 2013, p. 8). However, research by Kremer shows that Dutch people usually feel a sense of 'conditional solidarity' with foreign nationals and that only a small number of Dutch people want to see foreign nationals for always and entirely excluded from the welfare state, although there is a feeling that these foreign nationals should 'give something back' in return for this solidarity. Therefore, migrants with a job are more accepted by Dutch people than unemployed migrants. Migrants themselves also consider this expectation of reciprocity to be reasonable (Kremer, 2016).

Based on her findings, Kramer does not believe you have to choose between migration and the welfare state, and believes it is possible to create a welfare state that is migration-proof. To this end, she gives a number of concrete proposals in her book *Vreemden in de verzorgingsstaat* [Aliens in the welfare state], (Kremer, 2013, p. 206 e.v.) one of which is the 'contribution state'. In this scenario, social security is individualised to a certain degree and migrants' welfare entitlement is based on the individual contribution they have made to the welfare state.

Effect on migration

Cohesion in society and the prevailing perception regarding the desirability (or lack thereof) of migration are significant factors in determining migration policy. Migration currently plays a key role in the identified divide in society: one group is mainly positive about migration and the other is mainly negative. The population's feeling of mutual solidarity and the question of to what degree it is extended to people outside their own ethnic group (including refugees) both determine the instruments that the government can employ within a democratic society in order to shape migration policy.

Issues relating to future social cohesion in the Netherlands also play a key role, since migration patterns can be influenced by how welcome migrants feel in the Netherlands and how much of a chance they are given to build a life here. In the event of an increase in negative feelings towards migrants and refugees, it is conceivable that the number of immigrants and refugees coming to the Netherlands may decline and repatriation rates of Dutch citizens with a migrant or refugee background may increase.

⁹ See subsection 1.3 for more information.

¹⁰ Only a small proportion of global migration involves migrants coming to the EU and only a small proportion of this subset involves migrants coming to the Netherlands. As mentioned in the introduction, the scope of this study is restricted to this specific group of migrants.

¹¹ Unless specified otherwise, the data referred to in this trend analysis are 'international migrant stock data' (the number of people living in a different country from their country of birth).

¹² <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/theme/international-migration/>

In this report, the ACVZ – just like the UN – distinguishes between migrants and refugees. For the definition of both terms, see Annex 3. However, distinction between the two is not always easy. Firstly, people often have multiple reasons for migrating, some of which may

be asylum-related and some of which may not. Secondly, some people do not fit the definition of the term 'refugee', but still migrate with the objective of claiming asylum. Such people are only classified as non-refugees (i.e. migrants) once they have completed an asylum procedure in a foreign country and their application has been rejected.

¹³ <https://www.questia.com/magazine/1P3-3704817331/the-nansen-initiative-building-consensus-on-displacement>

¹⁴ Due to the lack of other sources, this subsection is primarily based on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project and the Peace Research Institute.

¹⁵ Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Number of Conflicts, 1975–2016.

<http://ucdp.uu.se/#/encyclopedia>. This decline is not yet reflected in the statistics in this subsection, as they only include the figures until 2014.

¹⁶ The projections by the World Bank, the UN and the IMF do not look more than two or three years into the future. The OECD does publish long-term projections for economic growth on its website (the last of which was from 2014), although these projections exclude Africa from consideration (with the exception of South Africa). Other than that, the OECD's projection roughly matches the projection made by the CEPS. Also, see https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=EO95_LTB#

¹⁷ The projections in this report are based on two large-scale global models: Macroeconomic General Equilibrium (MaGE), Modelling International Relationships in Applied General Equilibrium (MIRAGE) and a European model called NEMESIS. The MaGE and MIRAGE models were developed by the Paris-based research centre CEPII. MaGE's calculations are based on data on 147 countries collected by the World Bank, the UN and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). For more information about the models used, see Annex A (p. 125 et seq.) and Annex D (p. 138 et seq.) of the aforementioned report.

¹⁸ The comparison was made based on purchasing power parity, a method of comparing household purchasing power within countries, including correction for differences in price level.

¹⁹ These are 59 countries that comply with four conditions, including a period of at least six years of rapid economic growth (3.5% or more) that is at least two percentage points higher than in the previous period and is succeeded by a period of at least ten years of economic growth of 2%. See also OECD, 2016, p. 273.

²⁰ United Nations Population Division, 2017, Data files, probabilistic population projections based on the World Population Prospects, table population age 20–64. <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/>.

²¹ See <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Graphs/Probabilistic/POP/TOT/> for the various projections.

²² In 2016, the Netherlands was hailed as an 'innovation leader' by the EU, having scored 21% above the EU average. The Netherlands achieved particularly high scores in international scientific co-publications, public-private co-publications and foreign licensing and patent income, although Dutch businesses are lagging behind with regard to investment in R&D.

https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/facts-figures/scoreboards_nl

²³ The assumed connection between innovation and increased labour productivity is not as simple as is often thought. The growth rate of labour productivity in the Netherlands has been decreasing since the 1970s and digitisation has not changed this state of affairs. This is known as the 'Solow computer paradox'. Also see P. de Beer: 'Nieuw kabinet negeert zorgelijke stagnerende toename productiviteit' (New government ignores stagnating productivity growth). Dutch newspaper Financieel Dagblad, 23 October 2017. http://fd.nl/tekst/HFD_20171023_0_009_013

²⁴ <http://statline.cbs.nl>. Table of key figures for various population projections and observations.

²⁵ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52012DC0795>

²⁶ See subsection 1.3

²⁷ Social cohesion is defined as a 'mutual feeling of connectedness, solidarity and trust'.

²⁸ Here, the CEPS uses the definition established by D. Held et al in *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture*, Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.

²⁹ See <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/08/03/als-globaliserende-burger-voorbij-holt-gaat-het-wringen-3502628-a1514567#lightbox>

³⁰ See <https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2016/09/13/twijfels-aan-het-symbool-van-de-antiglobalisering-4266466-a1521175>

³¹ <http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/declaration>

³² The World Trade Organisation is an organisation of countries that monitor compliance with trade agreements between countries.

³³ The GATS is a multilateral WTO trade agreement, which means that it applies to all members of the WTO.

³⁴ Here, the term 'citizen' means everyone who holds the nationality of a particular (in this case OECD) country, regardless of any possible migration history.



³⁵ <https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2017/27/gezin-nog-steeds-belangrijkste-reden-voor-immigratie>

³⁶ Including a proposed directive to establish a common procedure for international protection (COM(2016)0467), as well as a proposed directive to make subjects of third countries or stateless people eligible for international protection, to establish a uniform status for refugees or people eligible for subsidiary protection and to organise the concrete execution of the protection activities (COM(2016)0466).

³⁷ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3081_en.htm

³⁸ <https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/maatwerk/2017/06/migrantenmonitor-2014-2015>, table 2.

³⁹ See https://ec.europa.eu/netherlands/news/commissie-presenteert-voorstellen-over-de-toekomst-van-de-eu-met-27-landen_nl



Section 3

Contextual scenarios

3.1 Introduction

Contextual scenarios are conceivable futures in which possible developments are clustered in a logical manner. Contextual scenarios are not prognoses or predictions; they are thought experiments. The contextual scenarios focus on 'exogenous factors'. These are defined as factors that influence migration and migration policy, but can only be controlled by the Dutch government to a limited extent, if at all. In this study, the factors 'European Union' and 'social cohesion' have been classified as partly exogenous, as some aspects can be controlled and some cannot. These factors are addressed both in the contextual scenarios and in the policy scenarios in the next section. Subsection 1.3 explains how the contextual scenarios were formulated.

In Section 2, the exogenous factors that influence migration management were analysed, which showed that developments between now and 2030 were relatively straightforward with regard to a number of factors. These factors were therefore fixed for all contextual scenarios. However, there was great uncertainty in relation to other factors, so these other factors served as variables for the contextual scenarios.

In the next subsection, we will first discuss the common principles of the contextual scenarios before addressing the uncertain factors used as variables in the contextual scenarios. Finally, we will present the four contextual scenarios.

3.2 Certain factors

Socioeconomic development in Africa and Asia

In the period between now and 2030, the economies in Africa and Asia will continue to grow faster than those in Europe. As a result, the disparity in prosperity between Europe and many Asian/African countries will decline, although Europe will still be significantly ahead of these nations in 2030. The economic growth in Africa and Asia will result in a growing middle class and, although this will not reduce migration potential (both legal and illegal) from these countries, it could reduce the levels of conflict migration. The same applies to public spending in countries of origin with regard to labour market policy, education and social security.

Population growth in Africa and Asia

The population in Asia and Africa will continue to grow. This population growth combined with the disparity of prosperity both within these continents and between these continents and Europe could result in unrelentingly high migration potential. Whether or not the population growth will actually result in migration depends on other factors, predominantly socioeconomic in nature.



Ageing


Many countries, including the Netherlands, have an ageing population. How much this will affect the demand for labour migrants depends on other factors, such as socioeconomic developments in both Europe and the Netherlands and the consequences of technical innovation on the demand for workers.

3.3 Most decisive uncertain factors

The trend analysis specifies a number of factors that involve a greater or lesser degree of uncertainty with regard to their future developments. These are the factors that serve as variables in the scenario study.

The uncertain factors that in ACVZ's opinion will have the greatest effect on the possibility of managing migration are, on the one hand, the trinity of globalisation, the development of the international legal order and the development of the EU and, on the other, social cohesion in the Netherlands. These two factors are represented in a coordinate system.

Figure 11: Contextual Scenarios for Migration in 2030



Globalisation, the international legal order, international cooperation and the EU

Globalisation represents the widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness. In order for countries to compete, they must keep their economies open to trade, investment and migration. It is possible that the process of globalisation will continue into the future, although it has recently come under pressure expressed in the form of increasing protectionism.

Since the Second World War, the international legal order has been characterised by efforts to conduct dialogue and work together. Recently, international agreements were made regarding – among others – the effects of climate change, combating illegal migration and reception of refugees. It is possible that international cooperation will increase further in various areas, which will necessitate further agreements on migration regulation, resulting in more manageable migration flows. Another possibility is that the trend towards increasing nationalism and protectionism will continue further, cooperation will decrease and every country will increasingly serve its own interests. This will result in migrant flows continuing in peaks and troughs and a high probability that this irregular pattern will increase even more.

The EU is currently developing a single policy for asylum and migration, which is an extremely arduous process, although it is possible that the EU will have greater success as time goes by. However, the EU has come under pressure since the Brexit vote, and it is even possible that the EU will collapse or decline in significance.

Social cohesion within Dutch society

There is currently a certain degree of polarisation in the Netherlands within which views on migration play an important role. It is possible that this trend will continue, although the tide could also turn as a result of political decisions and social initiatives.

3.4 Other uncertain factors

Conflicts

It is unclear whether the number of conflicts will increase or decrease in the future. Other factors that have also been identified as driving forces of migration, such as economic growth and the resulting socioeconomic development, have a positive 'peacekeeping' effect. However, we are currently witnessing an upswing in violent conflicts near EU territory, which increases potential migration to the EU, and it is possible that this trend may continue in the years to come.

Migration due to climate change

The fact that climate change is occurring is certain, although there is great uncertainty regarding where and how intensively the effects will manifest



themselves, meaning developments in the number of climate migrants are also highly unpredictable. Most scientists expect that climate migration will be predominantly regional, although this is not an absolute certainty.

Innovation and economic growth in Europe and the Netherlands

The expected demand for labour migrants is uncertain and depends to a significant degree on the question of whether and to what extent the European and Dutch economies grow, as well as on developments in innovation.

3.5 Global contextual scenarios

The *global* contextual scenarios are based on the assumption that, by 2030, globalisation will have continued to grow and that international cooperation and the development of the international legal order (including the EU) will have intensified. Africa and Asia have realised strong economic growth and their populations have grown substantially, while there is significant ageing in the Netherlands and Europe. In addition, the number of conflicts in the world has declined, climate change has not (as yet) sent a substantial wave of climate migrants to Europe and the highly innovative Dutch economy is growing fast.

In the contextual scenario *Global and united*, social cohesion in the Netherlands is high, while in the scenario *Global and divided*, social cohesion is poor.

Global contextual scenarios

Globalisation has continued to rise and the world economy is gradually growing. People and businesses are increasingly international in their outlook. As an increasing number of people is enjoying increasing amounts of disposable income and travel is becoming more affordable, people are taking holidays abroad far more often. People from different parts of the world are more frequently coming into contact with one another. Families are far more frequently spread across multiple countries and international family relationships are increasingly common. More and more people are opting to study or work in a different country and a growing number of countries is expanding the opportunities to do so. Nation states feel increasingly less need to protect their labour market and economy, more and more economic barriers are being removed and states are making it easier to go and work in different parts of the world.

The economy in the Netherlands is rapidly growing, innovating and digitising, especially in certain sectors, a development that is in line with the global trend for national or regional economies to specialise. The reasons for this are the increase in international trust and the decreasing sense that you have to be a 'jack of all trades'. The need for technically proficient professionals and the desire to attract top researchers to the Netherlands has increased in the so-called 'top sectors', especially in the areas of water management, logistics and agriculture/horticulture. As a result, there has been an increase in the number of jobs for people trained at the secondary technical level. Universities are also attempting to attract as much top talent as they can. Many Dutch people are moving abroad to work in specialised sectors, predominantly to destination

countries in the EU, Asia and America.

In Africa and Asia, the economy is growing faster than in Europe. As a result, their middle classes are growing. In combination with the population growth, this has created greater potential migration to Europe.

Investment in the public sector in these countries is helping reduce migration pressure to some degree.

The international legal order is also developing further and trust between nation states continues to grow, resulting in a decline in the number of conflicts. There is increasing awareness that global problems require global solutions, as is the case for the issues of migration and climate change. The global community has proven capable of making agreements regarding the reception and redistribution of refugees and the definition of a refugee has been expanded in the Refugee Convention. The Convention now covers people fleeing due to factors such as climate change, large-scale violence or structural danger (survival migration) as well, and a substantial proportion of these migrants are accommodated by Europe (Betts, 2010). The result of this is a constant and regulated flow of refugees to Europe and a relatively low number of refugees travelling to Europe illegally.

The EU has integrated further with regard to asylum and migration; the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) has resulted in the realisation of a Qualification Directive, a Procedure Directive and a Reception Directive.

In addition, directives have been formulated governing the issues of labour migration (seasonal migration, researchers) and family migration. The EU has set up hotspots around the world where EU asylum applications can be submitted.

The applications are processed on-site in accordance with the standards established in the relevant EU directives (external processing). The redistribution of migrants that are granted admission to the EU remains a challenge, especially with regard to compliance with and execution of agreements. Refugees admitted to the EU who are admitted to the less prosperous Member States regularly choose to illegally migrate to a more prosperous Member State rather than to legally stay somewhere with fewer opportunities.

Global and united

The government has greater control over the globalisation process, is able to get the people who are losing out better involved in this process and is adjusting social security to meet the needs of the new era. In addition, a large number of successful social initiatives are boosting social cohesion in the Netherlands. The process of increasing physical separation of population groups within residential areas has been halted, meaning that different groups are more often in contact with each other, e.g. in shops, at school and within clubs and associations. As a result, solidarity between the various population groups is increasing in the Netherlands.

Global and divided

Globalisation has resulted in Dutch society developing an increasing number of dividing lines based on factors such as education level, employment/unemployment, ethnicity and religion, and income disparity is increasing. We are seeing increasing clashes between transnational elites and the 'sedentary' section of society. The different population groups are also increasingly grouping together geographically. The more universalist citizens are concentrated in the historic and rapidly internationalising city centres, the underprivileged – including many people from a migrant background – live in the post-war districts on the outskirts of the cities, while the more particularist citizens with no migrant background live in the neighbouring municipalities and in rural areas. The welfare state is under severe pressure and solidarity with people outside your own group is less common. The rising demand for healthcare is primarily met by the use of advanced healthcare robots. The working section of the population – especially those with a higher than average income – no longer look to the government for their pensions, but save money themselves or via their employer.



3.6 National contextual scenarios

The *National* contextual scenarios assume that a turning point was reached in the development of the international legal order and that a process of deglobalisation has started. The international legal order is weakening and the EU has been watered down. Africa and Asia have realised strong socioeconomic growth and their populations have grown substantially, while there is significant ageing in the Netherlands and Europe. Many innovative companies have moved to Asia, the number of conflicts in the world has increased, climate change has resulted in a large number of climate migrants to Europe and the Dutch economy is growing slowly and is not very innovative in nature.

In the contextual scenario *National and united*, social cohesion in the Netherlands is high, while in the scenario *National and divided*, social cohesion is low.

National contextual scenarios

In the years to come, countries will steer a more nationalistic course, resulting in a decline in international cooperation and reducing the relevance of the international legal order. Following strongly nationalistic developments in Russia, Turkey, the United States and the United Kingdom, the deglobalisation trend has also reached the EU. Euroscepticism is present in many Member States, common standards and values are called into question and it is increasingly difficult to achieve shared viewpoints. The idea of a multi-speed Europe is gaining ground. The Member States are unable to agree on redistribution of asylum seekers and resettlement from third countries, nor are they able to make agreements with neighbouring regions of the former EU to combat illegal migration, resulting in an increased level of illegal migration to Europe. All of the above results in peaks and troughs in the flow of migrants to the Netherlands.

International institutions have lost a lot of their influence. The weakness of the international community means that few to no international agreements can be made regarding the reception and redistribution of climate migrants and refugees. This results in an increase in illegal, unregulated migration with human traffickers reaping the benefits. The long-prevailing nationalistic/patriotic feelings and corresponding policy decisions result in global protectionism, causing trade wars and a decline in world trade. Europe is at risk of relapsing into a 19th century landscape of relatively small independent states, the difference being that these states no longer have the power and wealth that they once enjoyed, with no more colonies, no military hegemonies, few relevant raw materials and small markets. They have to build a future within a 21st century in which the global order has shifted. Jobs are lost within the EU and there is little demand for labour migrants.

Economic growth and markets are mainly to be found on other continents, primarily Asia and, to a lesser degree, Africa. However, protectionist policy predominates in these continents and in America, which seriously limits opportunities for European countries.

In Africa, the economy is growing faster than in Europe. As a result of this, their middle classes are growing and, in combination with the population growth, this has created greater potential migration to Europe. Investment in the public sector in these countries is helping reduce migration pressure to some degree.

In the Middle East and Africa, conflicts continue or new leaders take control with an iron fist, resulting in repression of political opponents and journalists, among many other abuses. The relatively weak governance structure in African countries, the lack of an adequate infrastructure to repel climate change and the fact that the continent's strong economic growth is failing to provide enough jobs for the rapidly increasing population results in a constant flow of migrants (albeit in peaks and troughs), of which at least a part will head for the EU.

The Dutch economy is experiencing a prolonged period of zero growth, the population is ageing and the innovative nature of the Dutch economy is under pressure. Top-level expertise has to be imported, especially within highly specialised and innovation-oriented activities, and the Netherlands faces stiff competition from other countries who are fighting each other to attract this expertise. In addition, it is not uncommon for Dutch experts to be attracted to other countries.

National and united

The more protectionist, Netherlands-first direction creates a stronger sense of social cohesion and mutual solidarity and the process of deglobalisation has resulted in a reduction of inequality. The residents of the Netherlands are increasingly realising that they have to pull together, resulting in less focus on people's own social, ethnic or religious group and greater realisation that we are all Dutch citizens, regardless of our background or social status. The classic welfare state has been reformed, although it has retained its principle of mutual solidarity and care for the weaker members of society. However, it is increasingly difficult for people to afford contributions to this welfare state due to the long-term lack of growth.

National and divided

The mutual global distrust and the economic problems have had an impact on social cohesion in the Netherlands. People feel less connection with others and different groups are increasingly in conflict with each other. People are primarily identifying themselves in terms of their own regional, social, ethnic or religious group and less strongly as 'Dutch'. The government has made drastic cuts to social security, resulting in more and more people being marginalised and forced to fend for themselves in the fringes of society.





Section 4

Policy scenarios

4.1 Introduction

Policy scenarios explore future situations that are considered desirable with regard to a policy issue (vision), as well as the policy that would be required in order to realise this state of affairs (strategy). Once these visions and strategies have been formulated, these policy scenarios give insight into the various ways in which certain issues can be tackled and potential intended and unintended effects. In addition, policy scenarios can facilitate more open discussion of the values and objectives of the policy and provide inspiration for new ground to be broken (PBL, 2013, p. 50).

Policy scenarios generally assume that a certain value will dominate policy in the decades to come. To provide the greatest insight possible into policy alternatives, the policy scenarios should distinguish and represent the greatest possible number of positions in the social debate concerning what policies should be implemented. Therefore, in contrast to contextual scenarios, policy scenarios are normative in nature.

In this section, the ACVZ presents three policy scenarios based on the assumption that, in 12 years' time, we will still live in a democratic state under the rule of law (although this is not a static state and the degree to which this democratic state is valued and appreciated can differ). Partly for this reason, during the formulation of the policy scenarios, the ACVZ consciously decided that it would not necessarily restrict itself simply to the frameworks of existing treaties, case law and legislation. However, the following section, in which the three policy scenarios are assessed based on the four contextual scenarios, does pay attention to the matter of legal soundness.

The focal point of the policy scenarios presented is aliens policy, although proposals are also made with regard to the labour market, social security, foreign policy, development cooperation, integration, education and healthcare. This section also contains policy proposals relating to the EU and social cohesion. The Dutch government only has partial influence over these two factors and they are therefore featured in both the contextual scenarios and the policy scenarios. See subsection 2.1 for further explanation of this matter.

Visions

This section presents three visions that in the ACVZ's opinion represent the various positions that dominate the migration debate in the Netherlands in 2018 and are also expected to remain relevant in the coming years. These visions are:

- Dutch economic interests
The aim of this vision is to ensure the Dutch economy benefits from migration.
- Humanitarian mandate
The aim of this vision is to offer protection to refugees and migrants and strengthen their legal status.

- Burden on society

The aim of this vision is to restrict immigration to the Netherlands as much as possible, as it is considered disadvantageous to society.

Current migration policy involves aspects of all three of these visions. Policy for highly skilled migrants is an example of a strategy based on the first vision, while asylum policy is mainly the result of a combination of the second and third visions. Current asylum policy features sufficient guarantees to help foreign nationals requiring protection in the Netherlands and to gain a residence permit (provided they are already in the Netherlands), which reflects the second vision. On the other hand, the Netherlands operates restrictive admittance policies for refugees, e.g. offering them no legal entry routes to the Netherlands. This reflects the third vision, the objective of which is to restrict immigration to the Netherlands as much as possible.

The ACVZ remains entirely impartial regarding the desirability of the visions presented in this section; they are simply an acknowledgement of the fact that they exist. Therefore, when the ACVZ talks about 'future situations considered desirable with regard to policy issues', this does not mean that the policy scenarios presented here are considered desirable by the ACVZ. The policy scenarios simply describe how the ACVZ thinks each specific vision could (or could not) become reality.

Strategies


Visions can be realised by means of a variety of strategies. The three identified visions and the corresponding strategies are discussed below, paying attention to:

- the coalition of actors that would shape the strategy and the management style that these actors would adopt;
- the measures that these actors would take;
- the coordination with related policy (part of related areas);
- possible synergy or conflicts that could be involved (PBL, 2013, p. 51).

When discussing the strategies in this section, the description of the coalition of actors and a general discussion of the strategy will be followed by addressing the issues of asylum migration, economic migration and family migration, in that order. Every subsection will conclude with a reflection on coordination with related policy.

4.2 Dutch economic interests

Figure 12: Summary of 'Dutch Economic Interests' Policy Scenario



Vision

The basic principle of the Dutch Economic Interests policy scenario is that the Netherlands should economically benefit from migration. Foreign nationals' pasts do not matter, only their future and the opportunities open to them within Dutch society. During foreign nationals' residence in the Netherlands, it is important that they make a contribution to society. This applies to foreign nationals who are here temporarily as well as to foreign nationals who move to the Netherlands permanently. Participation is not only in society's interest, but also in the interest of the foreign nationals. This vision should be accompanied by the following strategy:

Strategy

Coalition of actors

The Ministry of Economic Affairs is responsible for shaping migration policy in close cooperation with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. If necessary, they will also involve the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice and Security, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport via the Ministerial Committee on Migration (MCM) and other interdepartmental consultation structures. There is also a consultation structure for communication with regions regarding the development of their labour markets and to involve them in the reception of asylum seekers, accommodation of residence permit holders and integration policy. Furthermore,

there is a consultation structure with the business sector, the associations of Dutch research universities and universities of applied sciences and the Netherlands Association of Senior Secondary Vocational Schools with regard to admissions policy.

The Immigration and Naturalisation Service (IND) and the Repatriation and Departure Service (DT&V) have been integrated into a single organisation together with the Employee Insurance Agency (UWV) and the Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO). This merger of important actors in the promotion of Dutch economic interests can ensure that there is enough final authority to implement and execute the policy and it is also in line with the agreements made at the European level regarding optimal streamlining of processes.⁴⁰ The national services within the EU are intensively working together with regard to admission, internal mobility of foreign nationals granted residence status, enforcement and return.

The measures taken

General

To the greatest extent possible, the strategy must focus on attracting highly qualified refugees and migrants and discouraging lesser qualified refugees and migrants unless there is a demand for them on the labour market. The strategy will also mean that some parts of treaties, such as the Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights, must be adjusted or repealed. The same applies to EU law (Union law). Furthermore, this strategy involves a great deal of investment in the economic employability of refugees and family migrants via integration, education and preparation for the labour market, among other measures. This will be combined with significant efforts to prevent unregulated migration by investing in support for border control (European or otherwise), combating human smuggling, monitoring of illegal residence and return policy. Technological developments in the fields of biometrics, camera surveillance, tracking of mobile phones, social media analysis, satellites and drones mean that the Netherlands is capable of substantially improving the effectiveness of border security and surveillance of foreign nationals.

The distinction between asylum, study, labour (including highly skilled migrants) and family migrants will become less relevant, as residence will primarily be granted based on the contribution that the migrant in question can make to society. To a certain extent, the different types of residence permits can therefore be abolished.

Asylum migration

The Dutch government invests in receiving refugees in the regions, as this is much cheaper than reception in the Netherlands. During selection for resettlement of refugees to the Netherlands from refugee camps in the regions,

the relocation of refugees at the European level and the assessment of asylum applications, refugees/migrants' applications are primarily evaluated based on their economic potential.⁴¹ Foreign nationals who submit an asylum application and possess the right qualifications are given opportunities to obtain a residence permit on economic grounds rather than asylum. In addition, incentives are built into the model that will give an advantage to foreign nationals with an economically-based residence permit and/or foreign nationals who do not require expenditure of public funds, compared to foreign nationals holding an asylum or family residence permit. If a refugee is granted a residence permit in the Netherlands on the grounds of asylum, investment will be made in an intensive, compulsory and customised process of integration, education, health and preparation for the labour market.



Box 1. Dutch economic interests – example measures for asylum migration

Resettlement and relocation of refugees

- Base resettlement and relocation activities on the needs of the Dutch economy and labour market. Ensure policy gives preferential treatment to highly qualified refugees.
- For 'shortage professions', allow businesses to recruit employees from refugee camps in the regions, and facilitators (reliable and expert counsellors for start-ups) can recruit entrepreneurs with a start-up. If necessary, they can provide language and integration training prior to the foreign nationals' arrival in the Netherlands.
- Create a scheme for study migration from refugee camps in the regions to Dutch educational institutions in the regions, together with a permit for virtual participation in Dutch society that enables refugees staying in the regions to work for a Dutch employer or study at a Dutch institution. Following their graduation from this Dutch institution, they will be given one year to find a job in the Netherlands; upon doing so, they will be granted a residence permit.

Asylum procedure in the Netherlands

- Evaluate asylum seekers who spontaneously submit an application in the Netherlands as quickly as possible based on their value to the Dutch labour market. Give asylum seekers who are highly likely to add value a certain period in which they must find a job or apply for a residence permit for foreign start-up companies. If they are successful, then a temporary residence permit can be granted immediately. If the asylum seeker loses his/her job and therefore also his/her temporary residence permit, then the application for asylum can still be assessed.
- Allow the business sector to recruit from asylum seekers' centres in the Netherlands. Also, establish offices of the Employee Insurance Agency and/or staff agencies in these centres.

Following approval of asylum applications

- Invest in permit holders and their family members by providing customised integration courses, education and preparation for the labour market.
- Establish incentives to find work, such as retraining for the 'shortage professions' free of charge, only granting permanent residence permits to refugees who have demonstrated their ability to support themselves and their family independently for a period of time (e.g. three years) or a scheme by which permit holders are not eligible for unemployment benefits, supplements and housing benefits straight away and are instead given a living allowance and accommodation.
- Only grant Dutch citizenship to economically successful refugees by setting requirements for income and work history in the Netherlands.

Following rejection of asylum applications

- Continue to invest in an effective return policy for rejected asylum applicants who are not of added value to the Dutch economy.
- Create a scheme that enables rejected asylum applicants who manage to find a job to be granted a temporary residence permit.
- Create a scheme that enables rejected asylum applicants who cooperated during their return to their country of origin to be given preferential treatment with regard to recruitment from abroad.

Economic migration

There will be a single temporary economic residence permit to replace all labour, study, highly skilled and entrepreneur residence permits. Within this model,

students therefore have unlimited access to the labour market and entrepreneurs can also take on salaried employment. The Netherlands develops a system that predicts what type of workers will be needed in the short and long term, taking into account innovative production methods. The government facilitates the business sector as much as possible with regard to recruiting required workers from abroad, but also increases businesses' responsibility for labour migrants' integration into Dutch society and for the return of unemployed foreign nationals. Policy is adjusted concerning economic migration to suit the often transnational life and circular or serial migration patterns of highly qualified migrants. A strict admissions policy is maintained for low-skilled employees, the basic principle of which is that, in the long term, education of the prioritised labour force and robotisation of the Netherlands will offer greater value than temporary labour migration of lower-skilled migrants. Preferential categories are introduced with regard to admissions policy for low-skilled workers, such as refugees in the regions, family members of refugees and migrants and foreign nationals who cooperated with voluntary return. A more customer-friendly visa policy is developed for business travellers and tourists.

Box 2. Dutch Economic Interests – example measures for economic migration

Admission of highly skilled migrants

- Maintain a system of recognised sponsors and expand it whenever possible. Facilitate the process for new national and foreign businesses, including SMEs with fewer than five employees, who wish to become a recognised sponsor. Ensure that the new implementing organisation makes a single decision regarding admittance in the case of businesses that are not a recognised sponsor. In this way, the contribution of economic migrants is assessed based on a points system in which innovative value will be assumed for activities in the 'top sectors'. Innovative value can also be recruited if there is regional demand for it.
- Establish an investor's permit and a scheme to allow admittance of start-up entrepreneurs, possibly in conjunction with a group of other EU countries.
- Establish 'innovation zones' in which the Netherlands can participate under WTO and GATS rules with a number of East Asian countries (South Korea, Indonesia, Japan) and African countries that have undergone a substantial diaspora or have historically had ties with the Netherlands (South Africa, Ghana, Nigeria, Burundi, Morocco). Within these innovation zones, establish a ten-year 'visa' for free movement that enables innovative service providers and their staff and researchers to work with no restrictions.⁴²
- Establish 'global skill partnerships', within which workers that are in short supply in the Netherlands (e.g. nursing or ICT staff) can be trained in the country of origin to enter the Dutch labour market.
- Strive to make a visa for jobseekers part of the Mobility Partnerships. Agree Mobility Partnerships with countries to which the EU wishes to return rejected foreign nationals. In exchange for taking back the rejected asylum applicants, these countries can send talented workers to the EU.

Recruitment of lower-skilled workers

- Ensure the primary focus is to facilitate deployment of the prioritised labour force. Expand the range of the prioritised labour force to include long-term residents from other EU Member States and asylum permit holders in other EU countries who have resided there for more than three years; this will ensure that the labour potential of these EU residents is no longer neglected. In the event that no members of the prioritised labour force are available, only allow temporary labour migration via secondment and recruitment treaties and under strict conditions.
- Give family members of migrants priority with regard to the recruitment of temporary labour migration, as well as rejected asylum applicants and asylum applicants whose temporary residence permit was withdrawn and who then cooperated with voluntary return.

Length of stay

- Only grant a permanent residence permit to migrants who have demonstrated for a consecutive period of time (e.g. three years) that they are capable of supporting themselves and their family (including if they migrated as an asylum seeker or family migrant).
- Only grant Dutch citizenship to economically successful migrants by setting requirements for income and work history in the Netherlands. In order to facilitate the often transnational lives of highly qualified migrants, relax the rules concerning the declaration of renunciation, which prevents double nationalities.
- Withdraw the residence permit in the event the holder loses their job or their income drops below a specified level. In tandem with this measure, operate an active return policy for labour migrants who no longer comply with the requirements, comparable to the system in place for rejected asylum applicants. The employers are responsible for ensuring migrants' return, and if a migrant does not return to the country of origin, the employer will no longer be permitted to recruit labour migrants from abroad and will pay a significant administrative fine.

Labour market policy

- Offer integration assistance – including knowledge of Dutch (even if the work is conducted in an English-speaking environment) – within the working environment in order to ensure that migrants' innovation value benefits not only their employer, but also society as a whole.
- Require companies that need labour migrants to contribute in various innovative ways to closing the gap that has opened up between privileged and underprivileged Dutch citizens as a result of labour market discrimination against and educational disadvantages amongst older (second generation) migrant groups and asylum status holders, e.g. via buddy workshops or work experience placements.

Visa policy

- Invest in the user-friendliness of the visa policy: further expand the 'orange carpet' policy,⁴³ spread consulates across the country, mobile visa offices, opportunities for digital procedures, etc.
- Create more fluid boundaries between short-term visas and economic residence permits or abolish the distinction altogether.
- Establish an entry-exit system to give greater insight into illegal residence.

Family migration

Family migration policy takes into account the fact that underprivileged family members will probably cost society money. For this reason, family members of lower-skilled workers residing in the Netherlands temporarily via secondment or recruitment treaties (see the subsection on economic migration) will not be permitted entry. On the other hand, family migration policy also takes into account the fact that people function better when their family is with them. Therefore, family migration remains possible for all migrants who can support these family members, and permission should be granted as soon as possible for those migrants who can. The model has to be attractive to family migrants with economic potential and innovative value. Therefore, foreign nationals who submit an application for family reunification are given the opportunity to receive an economic residence permit rather than a family residence permit. Incentives within the model give preferential treatment to family migrants who hold an economic residence permit and/or are not a drain on public funds. Family migrants who are granted a residence permit in the Netherlands on non-economic grounds become eligible for an intensive, compulsory and customised process of integration, education, health and preparation for the labour market. Family migration policy is fine-tuned to better suit the often transnational family life of migrants with economic value.



Box 3. Dutch economic interests – example measures for family migration

Admission

- Do not permit family migration for lower-skilled employees working in the Netherlands temporarily via the Posting of Workers Directive, the Seasonal Migration Directive or recruitment treaties.
- Facilitate access to family migration for sponsors who are highly economically successful (who earn or own a lot or make another highly useful contribution to the Dutch economy), with no integration requirements, extended age requirements, no accommodation requirements, quick turnaround times, etc. Make this applicable not only to highly skilled migrants (as is currently the case), but to all residents of the Netherlands, including Dutch citizens.
- Admit family members (including those outside the nuclear family) of lower-skilled workers in the event they are demonstratively of value to the Dutch labour market. This will be measured based on a points system. Give these migrants priority over other labour migrants when recruiting lower-skilled workers, as it is assumed that people who already have family here will find it easier to socially and economically integrate into society.
- Trade, tax and social security treaties combined with recruitment, return and transfer agreements can partly influence the scale of and preconditions for family migration. These treaties and agreements can – depending on the position (socioeconomic or otherwise) of the head of the family – facilitate various types of temporary mobility for workers and their families as an alternative to permanent migration to enable the workers to have a family life at the global level (together, but in different locations). Structure social security services, such as child allowance, childcare allowance, health insurance for the whole family and access to national or international education, in such a way that transnational family life will not be impeded by bureaucracy. Give multinationals or transnationally operating employers/clients (including educational institutions) the freedom to regulate family migration within WTO zones (see Box 2 for further information) and make them responsible for their employees and their employees' families. Also, allow them to define the size of the family, meaning that family migration of parents or brothers and sisters can be made optional based on the available package.

Following admittance

- Give family migrants immediate access to the labour market. When doing so, establish incentives to stimulate migrants to find employment, such as retraining them for 'shortage professions' at no charge and restricting the issue of permanent residence permits to family members who have worked for a certain consecutive period (e.g. three years).
- Make employers (including educational and research institutions) responsible for the integration and labour market orientation of family members of their labour migrants as well, to ensure that the Netherlands optimally benefits from the value added by labour migrants and their (often highly qualified) partners. For this purpose, ensure employers actively execute fiscally attractive policy to enable couples to build a career together (dual career policy).
- Establish requirements relating to income and employment history in the Netherlands as preconditions for residence instead of an integration requirement. In order to facilitate the often transnational lives of highly qualified migrants, relax the rules concerning the declaration of renunciation, which prevents double nationalities.

Coordination with related policy areas

This model enables synergy with regard to the promotion of economic growth and further development of the knowledge economy. Potential areas of conflict

are mainly found in relation to displacement in the labour market and fears in this regard, so it is important to guarantee all Dutch citizens have equal rights in the labour market. The labour market must be structured in such a way to prevent or remove structures that make migrants cheaper for employers to hire than Dutch citizens, ensuring a level playing field. Furthermore, for financial reasons, the Dutch government must invest in measures to combat the main causes of migration stemming from conflict, climate, population growth and economic malaise.

Box 4. Dutch economic interests – example measures for related policy

National

- Establish a scheme within which migrants/employers of migrants must make the same social security contributions as Dutch citizens/employers of Dutch citizens and in which migrants can transfer or cash in their accrued benefit rights if they leave the Netherlands.
- Enable gradual access to social security via a transitional model; this will serve as an extra incentive to make an economic contribution to our society.
- Ensure that all services made available to refugees and migrants in the areas of customised investment in education and preparation for the labour market are also made available to unemployed Dutch citizens.


International

- Play a leading role in international climate treaties and ensure we advance from the chasing pack into a leading position with regard to developments in the energy transition.
- Invest more in conflict prevention, education in developing countries (due to its 'pacifying' effect and the influence that the education of women has on birth rates) and the structure of the rule of law in countries of origin.
- Remove obstacles to trade with regard to products from countries of origin and prevent product dumping in countries of origin.
- Make international efforts to prevent structures that enable vade tax evasion in countries of origin and stop facilitating constructions for tax avoidance in the Netherlands.
- Invest in encouraging public spending in countries of origin due to the limiting effect that this has on migration of underprivileged people.



4.3 Humanitarian mandate

Figure 13: Summary of 'Humanitarian Mandate' Policy Scenario



Vision

The rights of migrants and the humanitarian aspects of migration are the central focus of this vision. The Netherlands provides international protection to whomever needs it and conducts a humanitarian asylum policy. In addition to offering protection to refugees under the terms of the Refugee Convention, the Netherlands also extends this protection to other 'survival migrants', including those who have been forced to leave their country of origin due to climate change or large-scale violence. The rights and interests of children are given central focus in this regard. Further aspects of the humanitarian approach include the Netherlands striving for effective reception of refugees and migrants within society while taking into account the interests of the rest of the population. In this regard, attention must also be paid to the international dimension of a humanitarian refugee and migration policy. This policy recognises that migration takes place in a world where prosperity is unevenly distributed and that many countries have suffered greatly from armed conflicts and other threats to human safety and security. This vision should be accompanied by the following strategy.

Strategy

Coalition of actors

For this approach, a Ministry of Asylum, Migration and Integration is set up with refugees and migrants as its central focus. By means of a consultation model, this ministry closely collaborates with the municipalities, which are responsible for executing integration policy.

In addition, the Ministry of Asylum, Migration and Integration and the municipalities actively involve social organisations and NGOs, in both the process of policymaking and the execution of the policy. In this way, they collectively strive to facilitate a 'soft landing' for refugees and migrants in Dutch society. If required, the Ministry of Asylum, Migration and Integration involves the Ministry of Justice and Security, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs via the Ministerial Committee on Migration (MCM) and other interdepartmental consultation structures.

The measures taken

General

The strategy must focus on reinforcing the rights of refugees and migrants, both in the Netherlands and elsewhere in the world. Within this strategy, it is advisable to reject the idea that the children of refugees and migrants are also refugees/migrants. This can be done by introducing birthright citizenship into nationality law, which would automatically give Dutch nationality to all children born in the territory of the Netherlands. Another possibility is to ensure that Dutch nationality can be easily obtained for children born here. Furthermore, second generation refugees/migrants are no longer to be registered in the government's registration system as a 'Dutch citizen with a migrant background'. The Netherlands introduces a residence permit for people officially recognised as stateless and invests substantially in integration, education and preparation for the labour market for refugees and migrants to ensure they feel at home in the Netherlands as soon as possible.

Another concern is the living conditions of refugees and migrants staying in their region of origin and those who are in transit. The Netherlands collaborates with the region to create funding for good quality reception in the regions in order to ensure the welfare of refugees. This not only means a roof over their head, but also adequate food, sanitary facilities, good medical facilities, job opportunities and, above all, adequate education for children and youths. Technological developments in the field of camera surveillance, tracking of mobile phones, social media analysis, satellites and drones are used to identify migrants in dangerous or humanely precarious situations and provide them with aid.

Asylum migration

The Netherlands makes a substantial international effort to realise a global system for dealing with the issue of refugees and lobby for an expansion of the definition of the term 'refugee' that will include all people forced to leave their



country of origin due to a life-threatening situation against which no protection can be provided by the country of origin (survival migrants). In this regard, the government strives to ensure global distribution of the costs of reception and resettlement of refugees to ensure they are no longer forced to turn to illegal migration channels. The Netherlands plays a leading role in the resettlement of refugees by substantially increasing the number that the Netherlands takes each year. The Netherlands furthermore expands the range of legal migration channels for asylum seekers and maintains the opportunity to request asylum in the Netherlands. It also expands the grounds for granting an asylum permit (possibly in anticipation of a similar move by the international community) in order to ensure that all survival migrants have recourse to asylum.

Box 5. Humanitarian mandate – example measures for asylum migration

Resettlement, relocation, reception in the regions

- Ensure that all people who require protection from the Netherlands actually gain access to the Netherlands, e.g. by offering them opportunities to apply for asylum at the Dutch embassy, by opening asylum application desks at refugee camps in the regions or by granting a humanitarian visa to asylum seekers who wish to apply for asylum in the Netherlands.
- During selection of asylum seekers for resettlement or relocation, give priority to those who need the protection most urgently.
- Establish safe routes for refugees, e.g. by lobbying the EU to set up a border post for asylum seekers on the border between Turkey and Greece and in the Spanish enclaves in Africa.
- Make international efforts to change the definition of the term 'refugee' to include all survival migrants.

Asylum procedure in the Netherlands

- Invest in asylum seekers and their family members by providing customised education, healthcare and social counselling. Also, improve facilities in the reception locations to enable asylum seekers to recuperate better.
- Stop funding the first year of asylum reception via the development cooperation budget, leaving more money to fund high-quality reception in the regions. Fund reception of asylum seekers in the Netherlands via the budget for the Ministry of Asylum, Migration and Integration.
- Establish family reunification policy to also allow family members from outside residence permit holders' nuclear families to come to the Netherlands.

Economic migration

Humanitarian policy is also the basic principle when it comes to economic migration. This means that the rights of migrants who are hoping for a better life for economic reasons are an important focus of this vision. Wherever possible, the Dutch government helps to create legal migration channels for labour migration and invests in the socioeconomic development of migrants' regions of origin, e.g. by means of circular migration. Any labour migrants who are found to be here illegally are assisted and accommodated, and are either given

instructions on how to legalise their residence or returned to their country of origin.

Box 6. Humanitarian mandate – example measures for economic migration

Admission

- Help to prevent economically motivated asylum applications and illegal economic migration by offering legal migration channels for labour migrants and establishing schemes for study migration from migrants' countries of origin.
- Establish a circular migration scheme that permits migrants to work in the Netherlands for a maximum of nine months per year for three years, during which time they will participate in training and knowledge exchange. Upon expiry of the permit, enable extension of the residence permit to a period of five years, provided the migrant is offered a job. In addition, after three years of circular migration, give migrants the opportunity to set up a business in their country of origin by means of special microcredit for circular migrants and coaching from a Dutch entrepreneur.

Following admittance

- Ensure that foreign and Dutch students have equal access to the facilities available for new businesses. In particular, students will be supported and encouraged to incorporate innovative concepts into their business in order to help solve global problems such as food and water shortages.
- Ensure a 'soft landing' in the Netherlands. In cooperation with the municipalities in which the individual labour migrants/entrepreneurs will work and together with social organisations, ensure that appropriate education and guidance, care and voluntary-integration services are available to the migrants. Boost permit holders' participation in society by encouraging voluntary work, participation in clubs and societies, employment, etc.
- Repeal the rules concerning the declaration of renunciation, which prevents double nationalities.

Upon expiry of permit

- Further invest in an effective and humane return policy featuring customised education and coaching programmes focusing on employment, e.g. via Dutch businesses in the region of the country of origin within the framework of corporate social responsibility.

Family migration

The right to family life is a broadly shared value both in the Netherlands and abroad. It involves aspects of life that are more important than anything else to most people, like sharing your life with the people to whom you feel closest, caring for those to whom you feel a duty of responsibility and receiving care from the people you depend on. The ability to live your family life in your own way without interference from the government plays an important role in this context. Ensuring the welfare of children is a related and equally widely shared value. The basic principle of a policy scenario with humanitarianism as its central focus is that family life should be facilitated to the greatest extent possible. The rights and interests of children are given central focus in aliens policy.



Box 7. Humanitarian mandate – example measures for family migration

Admission

- Give foreign nationals who are residing legally in the Netherlands (either temporary or permanently) the right to family reunification, provided they satisfy a number of basic conditions with regard to income and accommodation. The current or future income earned by foreign family members will also be included in this assessment. In such cases, grant the family members a residence permit with the same validity period as that of the sponsor.
- Give minors who are residing legally in the Netherlands the unconditional right to reunification with their parents and minor brothers/sisters.
- Restrict monitoring of marriages of convenience to verification that the marriage took place and is being continued. How people wish to conduct their relationship (e.g. whether or not they live together) is their own business.
- Make any member of the sponsor's effective nuclear family eligible for family reunification; biological or legal ties are therefore not decisive, nor are family ties as defined in the country of origin.
- Ensure children are entitled to a residence permit if they have lived in the Netherlands for longer than five years. In the event that the parents have evaded supervision, the child will retain these rights regardless.

Following admittance

- Give family migrants immediate access to the labour market.
- Give members of the nuclear family of citizens exactly the same rights as citizens with regard to education and other public services. Offer language courses and/or retraining to family members of migrants.
- Via the option procedure, enable family migrants to obtain Dutch citizenship following a period of three years' residency. Relax the rules concerning the declaration of renunciation, which prevents double nationalities.

Coordination with related policy areas

Synergy is possible within the social domain. Conflicts mainly relate to any area in which more services are made available to refugees and migrants (especially rejected asylum applicants) than to other residents, as this creates resentment within society. Policy in which the Dutch government assesses the package of services for refugees and migrants as part of a broader framework of services for the general public can prevent this. Within this model, the government can ensure that other residents of the Netherlands who find themselves in a similar position have at least the same level of services available to them and are provided with the same guidance. In addition, synergy is possible between migration policy and development cooperation. Within this model, migration, study migration and labour migration are primarily policy instruments for development cooperation.

As part of a humanitarian policy, it is vital that the Netherlands takes into account the root causes of migration stemming from conflicts, climate, population growth and economic malaise.

Box 8. Humanitarian mandate – example measures for related policy

National


- Make accommodation, sanitary facilities, food and counselling available to all homeless people.
- Provide tailored social counselling and courses for other inhabitants who need it due to unemployment, health problems, etc.
- Spend an equal amount of time and money on daytime activities for seniors in care institutions as on counselling for asylum seekers.

International cooperation

- Play a leading role in international climate treaties and ensure we advance from the chasing pack into a leading position with regard to developments in the energy transition.
- Invest more in conflict prevention, education in developing countries (due to its 'pacifying' effect and the influence that the education of women has on birth rates) and the structure of the rule of law in countries of origin.
- Remove obstacles to trade with regard to products from countries of origin and prevent product dumping in countries of origin.
- Make international efforts to prevent structures that enable tax evasion in countries of origin and stop facilitating constructions for tax avoidance in the Netherlands.
- Invest in encouraging public spending in countries of origin due to the limiting effect that this has on migration.

4.4 Burden on society

Figure 14: Summary of 'Burden on society' policy scenario



Vision

The basic principle of this vision is that immigration is detrimental to society. The arrival of refugees and migrants – whether underprivileged or highly qualified – costs the Netherlands money and detracts from our cultural values. Migrants, refugees and their children and grandchildren place disproportionate strain on social security and – including highly qualified migrants – displace Dutch people on the labour market. Certain groups of migrants and their children and grandchildren are over-represented in crime statistics. The integration process is extremely slow and laborious, including for second and third generation migrants. Some migrants do not even have any ambition to integrate because it was not required of them in the past, as is the case with highly skilled migrants and scientists. The arrival of refugees and migrants threatens Dutch standards and values, and in some neighbourhoods, ethnic Dutch people feel like a minority in their own country. This is not only the case in deprived districts, but also in the city centres of Amsterdam and The Hague, for example, where English has become the primary language of communication and rich immigrants dominate the housing market. The basic principle of this vision is to restrict immigration to the greatest extent possible, with zero immigration constituting the ideal scenario. This vision should be accompanied by the following strategy:

Strategy

Coalition of actors

The Ministry of Justice and Security retains responsibility for aliens policy. The Directorate-General of Migration must actively involve the national police service, the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee (Koninklijke Marechaussee, KMar), the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism (Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, NCTV), the Inspectorate for Justice and Security (Inspectie Justitie en Veiligheid, iJenV) and the Social Affairs and Employment Inspectorate (Inspectie Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, iSZW) in the policy development process. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs must streamline foreign policy in consultation with the Ministry of Justice and Security and bring it into line with the desire to reduce immigration to zero. Within this model, central government must maintain a firm grip on the reins and will therefore hold sole responsibility for the development and execution of aliens policy.

The measures taken

General

Realisation of this vision is not possible within the current EU legal framework and EU policy. If the Netherlands wishes to realise this vision and the rest of the EU does not, then it will be necessary to exit the EU and renounce all of the relevant treaties, such as the Refugee Convention and the European Convention on Human Rights. In addition, the Netherlands will have to thoroughly amend a great deal of legislation (including the Aliens Act (Vreemdelingenwet), the

Netherlands Nationality Act (Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap) and maybe even the Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands itself.

Only temporary residence permits will be issued and Dutch citizenship will only be legally granted to people born to a Dutch parent. The model will be combined with significant efforts to prevent unregulated migration by investing in support for border control (European or otherwise), combating human smuggling, monitoring of illegal residence and return policy. Technological developments in the fields of biometrics, camera surveillance, tracking of mobile phones, social media analysis, satellites and drones mean that the Netherlands is capable of substantially improving the effectiveness of border security and surveillance of foreign nationals. In addition, the Netherlands invests in removing the root causes of migration in order to reduce migration pressure in the long term.

Asylum migration

The government removes opportunities to apply for asylum in the Netherlands and permits no or only a few refugees to enter the Netherlands in accordance with a quota. Instead, the Netherlands invests extensively in reception in the regions. The government tightens regulations for ongoing procedures and holders of temporary asylum permits. It will no longer be possible for these people to obtain a permanent residence permit or Dutch citizenship. Furthermore, legislation in the field of social security is adjusted to exclude permit holders from eligibility.



Box 9. Burden on society – example measures for asylum migration

Admission

- Only grant admittance to UNCHR 'quota refugees' who have undergone extensive screening and have passed a standards and values test before their arrival in the Netherlands. If desired, set the quota to zero.
- For ongoing cases, scrap the granting of residence permit on humanitarian grounds and the discretionary power of the Minister for Migration.
- Only offer temporary protection with no chance of permanent residence based on an agreement that the foreign national in question must work in specific sectors in the Netherlands.

Permit holders

- Withdraw residence permits from any holders convicted of a criminal offence.
- Make residence in the Netherlands less attractive and reduce the costs incurred by the state as much as possible. Only give aliens the right to accommodation in temporary living units together with a living allowance, enforce compulsory integration courses that migrants must pay for themselves, limit access to the labour market to 'shortage professions' with an obligation to accept job offers and confiscate financial resources or assets so that asylum seekers must pay for their own reception and procedure.
- Scrap rights to family reunification.

Following rejection or withdrawal of residence permit

- Detain illegal residents for the purpose of return.
- Criminalise illegal residence and the provision of assistance to illegal residents.
- Scrap the amnesty scheme for minors.

Economic migration

Within this vision, economic migration – including the migration of students and highly skilled migrants – is undesirable, as it causes displacement on the labour and housing markets and poses a threat to our culture. This means that the government strives to restrict the opportunities for economic migration to the greatest extent possible. The high skilled migrant scheme is scrapped. Only temporary residence permits are issued and foreign nationals can no longer obtain Dutch citizenship. The government aims to ensure that information and knowledge exchange with foreign countries is no longer conducted by means of permanent migration; instead, it must be done via more frequent journeys for a shorter duration and via digital communication. To facilitate this, a more customer-friendly visa policy is developed for business travellers and tourists.

Box 10. Burden on society – example measures for economic migration

Admission

- Enforce the Foreign Nationals (Employment) Act (Wet arbeid vreemdelingen, Wav) and set the quota in the act to zero, in principle. This means the Netherlands will retain the option to increase the quota in the event serious shortages occur in the labour market and no other options can be found to fill these shortages (see the subsection on asylum).
- Scrap all exemptions under the Foreign Nationals (Employment) Act and amend it in such a way that only Dutch citizens belong to the high priority labour force.

Following admittance

- Withdraw residence permits in the event holders are convicted of a criminal offence.
- Maintain the exclusion of access to social services for labour migrants (any use of social security means withdrawal of the residence permit).
- Establish compulsory integration courses to be paid for by the migrant in question, i.e. no longer exempt labour migrants from the Civic Integration Act (Wet Inburgering).
- Study migration is again a form of development aid. Permit it in a limited number of cases for certain study programmes that also serve the interests of the Netherlands (e.g. related to food or climate), and require foreign students to leave upon graduation.

Following rejection or withdrawal of residence permit

- Detain illegal residents for the purpose of return.
- Criminalise illegal residence and the provision of assistance to illegal residents.

Visa policy

- Invest in the user-friendliness of the visa process: further expand the 'orange carpet' policy, consulates across the country, mobile visa offices, opportunities for digital procedures, etc.

Family migration

As all refugees and migrants who are admitted to the Netherlands are only permitted temporary residence, family migration is not possible for them. The only way family members can come to the Netherlands is on their own initiative (e.g. as a quota refugee or as a labour migrant in a shortage profession under the Foreign Nationals (Employment) Act). Dutch citizens are only permitted to bring a foreign partner to the Netherlands under strict conditions.

Box 11. Burden on society – example measures for family migration

Admission

- Family migration is only possible for Dutch citizens of 25 years or above and the Dutch citizen's foreign partner must also be over 25 years.
- Foreign partners must take a job in one of the shortage professions during the first two years of their stay in the Netherlands, within the established quota. If the quota has been reached, they must wait another year. This work can be seen as part of the integration process and/or a social service obligation to allow them to get to know Dutch society and find their place within it.
- Biological children of the Dutch citizen will be Dutch citizens due to their parent's nationality. Any children of the foreign spouse under the age of 12 will also be permitted to come to the Netherlands.

Following admittance

- Children or foreign partners who are convicted of a criminal offence or misdemeanour will be deported. As the ECHR has been renounced, the person in question cannot be exempted from this rule based on the family life that they have built up in the Netherlands during their legal residence here.
- If the family requires social security assistance, they will only receive it for a limited period (max. one year). During this period, the family must prepare to relocate to the country of origin of the foreign partner or a different country.

Coordination with related policy areas

Striving to achieve zero migration makes it difficult for the business sector to recruit the workers it needs from abroad. This means that, wherever necessary, extra investment must be made in training the Dutch population in order to maintain a healthy labour market. The government develops a system in order to predict what type of workers will be needed in the short and long term, taking into account innovative production methods. Education is adjusted to meet these needs in a timely manner to minimise the need to recruit labour migrants from abroad. In addition, investment is made in robotisation, digitisation and further innovation of international means of transport. After all, we no longer share information and knowledge with foreign countries by means of permanent migration, instead obtaining it whenever necessary by making more frequent journeys for a shorter duration and via digital communication. Sectors of the Dutch economy in which no workers are available in the Netherlands will be relocated abroad.

Return agreements and hands-on cooperation during returns will be important factors in diplomatic ties with countries of origin, taking precedence over all other forms of cooperation (such as development cooperation or trade) with the exception of diplomatic ties relating to security. Furthermore, the government will invest in measures to combat the root causes of migration in order to further reduce migration levels.

Box 12. Burden on society – example measures for related policy

National

- Encourage businesses to invest in staff training for both new and existing employees. If they have demonstrably failed to do so, they can be banned from recruiting from abroad either permanently or until they pay a fine.
- Relocate sectors in which no workers can be found (e.g. agriculture and horticulture) abroad.

International

- Play a leading role in international climate treaties and ensure we advance from the chasing pack into a leading position with regard to developments in the energy transition.
- Invest more in conflict prevention, education in developing countries (due to its 'pacifying' effect and the influence that the education of women has on birth rates) and the structure of the rule of law in countries of origin.
- Remove obstacles to trade with regard to products from countries of origin and prevent product dumping in countries of origin.
- Make international efforts to prevent structures to evade taxes in countries of origin and stop facilitating constructions for tax avoidance in the Netherlands.
- Invest in encouraging public spending in countries of origin due to the limiting effect that this has on migration.

⁴⁰ Such as the EU Single Permit Directive. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/NL/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32011L0098>

⁴¹ Resettlement is the transportation of refugees from a reception country in which they sought protection (usually in the regions) to a country that has agreed to give them a permanent residence status with prospects of naturalisation. Relocation is the transportation of asylum seekers within the EU from one Member State to another Member State.

⁴² The E15 initiative, Trade and Innovation. Policy Options for a New Innovation Landscape, 2015. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/E15/WEF_Innovation_report_2015_1401.pdf

⁴³ A visa policy that makes it easier for visitors of economic or political importance to obtain a Schengen visa for the Netherlands.



Section 5

Testing the policy scenarios against the contextual scenarios

5.1 Introduction

In the previous section, we identified three visions that dominate the various positions in the migration debate within Dutch society today, and the ACVZ assumes these positions will remain the same until 2030. These visions are:

- *Dutch economic interests*
The aim of this vision is to ensure the Dutch economy benefits from migration.
- *Humanitarian mandate*
The aim of this vision is to offer protection to refugees and migrants and strengthen their legal status.
- *Burden on society*
The aim of this vision is to restrict immigration to the Netherlands as much as possible, as it is considered disadvantageous to society.

Subsequently, a rough description was given of how the identified visions could be realised (the strategy). These combinations of visions and strategies are referred to as 'policy scenarios'.

However, migration does not take place in a vacuum; it will take place within a future that is as yet unknown to us. To enable us to explore this unknown future, Section 3 introduced four contextual scenarios in which the factors that influence what can and cannot be done with regard to migration management were used as variables. The four contextual scenarios were then used to test how future-proof the policy scenarios are, providing answers to the following questions:

- To what extent can the policy scenario be realised within the contextual scenario?
- What are the strong points and weak points of this combination?
- To what extent can the scenario be adjusted in order to resolve the weak points?

This section contains a summary of the main findings of this process.

The testing was conducted based on the following indicators:

- consistency with international relations: to what extent is the policy compatible with the international relations described in the contextual scenarios?
- economic benefit: to what extent can the Netherlands gain an economic advantage with the policy within the described contextual scenarios?
- legal feasibility: will amendments have to be made to treaties and laws in order to implement the measures in the described contextual scenarios and are these amendments achievable?

- support base: how much support is there within Dutch society for the measures associated with each vision?
- security: what effect do the measures have with regard to the internal security of the future society described as a whole?

At the end of this subsection, you can find a figure that displays each policy scenario's score for the different indicators within each contextual scenario.

Explanation of Figures 15 to 17

Every subsection will begin with a figure that ranks the policy scenarios in each of the four contextual scenarios from best combination to worst combination. The ranking is based on the scores achieved by the policy scenario for each of the five indicators based on a three-point scoring system (+, +/- and -). When ranking the policy scenarios, the five indicators were equally weighted. Any readers that believe particular indicators should be weighted more heavily than others (e.g. economic benefit is more important than support base or vice versa) may end up with different rankings to those contained in this report.


Prior to the testing, two workshops were organised, the results of which were incorporated into the testing.

5.2 Dutch economic interests

This subsection gives a brief description of the assessment results for the Dutch economic interests policy scenario based on the contextual scenarios. The policy scenario is easiest to bring about in *Global and united* and most difficult to realise within *National and divided*.

Only these two ends of the spectrum will be discussed below.

Figure 15: Compatibility of the Dutch Economic Interests Policy Scenario with the four Contextual Scenarios⁴⁴



Dutch economic interests within the Global and united world

The Dutch economic interests policy scenario is easiest to realise within the Global and united world. Amendment of the policy scenario to optimise its compatibility with the world described in the contextual scenario is certainly possible.

The contextual scenario *Global and united* features a world that has moved further towards globalisation. The policies within *Dutch economic interests* that protect our economy and labour market less and facilitate temporary and permanent migration are well suited to this environment. Consequently, the policy is consistent with international relations.

The vitality and innovative strength of the economy in *Global and united* is supported by the measures and will result in economic benefits, although one problem area is that the proposed obligations for the business sector with regard to integration and return may prove restrictive. In this contextual scenario with a strong government and sufficient resources, this negative effect can be easily avoided by having the state retain this responsibility.

Some measures in the policy scenario (mainly in the area of asylum and family migration) are not compatible with the international treaties and international legal agreements. However, within *Global and united*, the Netherlands also has considerable interest in the stronger international legal order that has been created. Furthermore, in this world of strong economic growth and relatively low migration pressure, the disadvantages of not sticking to the measures as described are manageable. It is better to ensure that the policy remains in line with international agreements in combination with extra focus on diplomatic ties in order to better protect Dutch interests within migration policy in the international arena.

In the *Global and united* world, characterised by strong social cohesion, there is sufficient support for the *Dutch economic interests* policy scenario, which gives plenty of opportunities to newcomers and supports their integration into Dutch society, while at the same time supporting Dutch people who also require assistance. To further boost support amongst society, additional policy can be developed to ensure underprivileged foreign nationals are able to gain work experience and a number of aspects of the strict policy for unemployed migrants can be relaxed.

Finally, attention is paid to security policy and the balance between the risks of the relatively open borders on the one hand and the need to facilitate mobility on the other.

Dutch economic interests within the National and divided world

The Dutch economic interests policy scenario is most difficult to realise within the National and divided world. The policy is not consistent with the deglobalising world and it will generate little support. A number of thorough adjustments must be made, mainly within admissions policy for asylum seekers and refugees. Tightening of admissions policy for economic migrants – which is possible within the applicable frameworks – would also be a wise move.

It is not advisable to execute a policy that is highly attractive to labour migrants and economic migrants during periods of sluggish economic growth and little demand for foreign workers in the Netherlands. The policy is not consistent with the world in *National and divided*, which is characterised by deglobalisation and increasing protectionism.

Even so, most of the measures relating to the admission of economic migrants within the policy scenario are flexible enough to enable economic benefits even in periods of zero growth. However, the proposed admissions policy for asylum seekers and refugees will be very expensive. In addition to asylum seekers, the model will also attract a large number of economic migrants, and the focus on the labour market will not be very effective if there is little demand for foreign workers. Furthermore, within the National and divided world, executing return policy for migrants who are not permitted to stay will be even more complicated than it already is, given the isolationist course steered by many countries. After all, return is only possible with the cooperation of the countries of origin. The integration policy does offer some benefits, as it will mean that refugees and migrants will be better prepared to enter the labour market.

From the perspective of legal feasibility alone, the weaker international legal order within this world means it would be easier for the Netherlands to execute its own aliens policy in accordance with this policy scenario, as a number of aspects contravene the international agreements applicable today.


Several aspects of the proposed policy are poorly compatible in a world with poor social cohesion. It will further increase polarisation in society and it will be difficult to justify to Dutch people who have fallen on hard times, as further displacement on an already saturated labour market is an ever-present risk to them. The measures in this policy scenario focusing on the contribution that newcomers must make will soften these negative effects to some extent, although it will probably not be enough. From the perspective of the support base, it would be better to adjust the policy to suit the social reality in *National and divided*. If Dutch people increasingly have to fend for themselves and their immediate social circle, then it is logical that newcomers will have to do the same.

Finally, this world will also require security policy that strikes a balance between risk management and any necessary facility of mobility. An additional point for attention is the risk that the policy will deepen the divides between groups in society, causing greater conflict between these groups.

5.3 Humanitarian mandate

The *Humanitarian mandate* policy scenario has a very different point of departure. In this subsection, we will address how this policy scenario will stand up to the described future worlds of 2030. The policy scenario is easiest to realise in the *Global and united* world. In the ACVZ's view, the policy cannot be realised in the *National and divided world* (see Figure 16). Only these two ends of the spectrum will be discussed below.

Figure 16: Compatibility of the Humanitarian mandate Policy Scenario with the four Contextual Scenarios⁴⁵



Humanitarian mandate within the Global and united world

The *Humanitarian mandate* policy scenario is the easiest to achieve in the *Global and united* world, where it requires very few amendments. Some caution must be paid to how attractive the model is to less qualified foreign nationals in the event that developments in the labour market result in low demand for labour migrants.

The policy scenario is well suited to a world in which the international legal order is further developing and agreements regarding distribution of refugees have been made at the global and EU level.

The model will be expensive in the short term, as a great deal of investment will be required in refugees and migrants and many refugees and migrants who are admitted to the country will not be able to make an immediate contribution to the economy. However, this can be seen as a long-term investment that the Netherlands can afford to make in this *Global and united* world, especially as it will earn money for the Netherlands in the future. The possible attraction of less

qualified migrants is indeed a risk factor in the event that there is little demand for them on the Dutch labour market.

The legal soundness of the measures in the *Humanitarian mandate* policy scenario is high in the *Global and united* world. The Netherlands can dovetail its asylum procedure with international agreements with relatively ease.

Amongst this society, which is characterised by high levels of social cohesion and strong economic growth, there will be a great deal of support for a humanitarian and inclusive refugee and migration policy, and the same applies for the creation of legal migration channels for economic migrants.

Within the *Global and United* world, attention must be paid to the balance between risk management and an attractive asylum and migration policy.

Humanitarian mandate within the National and divided world

The Humanitarian mandate policy mandate is not achievable within the *National and divided* world. It would require amendment in so many areas that the amended policy would be a completely different policy scenario.

The measures are not compatible with a deglobalised world, as the weakened international legal order and the smaller EU will make it very difficult to promote more legal migration channels for migrants and resettlement of refugees. Bilateral relations may be able to mitigate this situation slightly.

The policy scenario costs a great deal of money, as it would attract substantial numbers of underprivileged refugees and migrants, despite the Netherlands having little demand for workers. In order to maintain our standard of living, the policy scenario must be thoroughly amended in a number of areas.

However, the legal soundness of the measures is high. In view of the weakened international legal order, some aspects of the described policy may have to be implemented into national law.

Within this society, in which Dutch people increasingly have to fend for themselves and resources are scarce, there will be no support for a humanitarian and inclusive refugee and migration policy. After all, if there is little solidarity at the national level and we do not have much money to spend, there is no reason to believe any policy as generous as this one would be implemented.


Finally, within the *National and divided* world, attention must be paid to the balance between risk management and an attractive asylum and migration policy. An additional point for attention is the risk that the policy will deepen the

divides between groups in society, causing greater conflict between these groups.

5.4 Burden on society

This subsection addresses how compatible the *Burden on society* policy scenario is with the possible future scenarios. The policy scenario works best within the *National and divided* world and worst within the *Global and united* world.

Figure 17: Compatibility of the Burden on Society Policy Scenario with the four Contextual Scenarios⁴⁶



Burden on society within the National and divided world

It is possible to realise the *Burden on Society* policy scenario within the *National and divided* world, although it could be useful to amend the policy scenario in certain areas in order to limit the negative economic effects. The degree to which the policy proposals are legally feasible will depend on the strength or weakness of the EU at this point.

The policy will be well suited to the deglobalising world of *National and divided*, in which other countries are also steering a protectionist course.

In this world, there is slow economic growth and the Netherlands has little demand for labour migrants, although migration pressure is still high due to the increasing number of conflicts and many climate migrants. In addition, the flow of migrants is volatile, as it has not been possible to make international agreements that more effectively regulate migration. This kind of restrictive migration and asylum policy can limit the resulting consequences for public funds, although border control and return policy also cost money.

Measures that deter migrants required by the Dutch labour force from coming to the Netherlands can also cost us money.

In the National and divided world, the international legal order has contracted and the EU is weaker. In this kind of world, policies that conflict with EU law and other treaties applicable today are more conceivable than in a future world in which the international legal order has further developed. However, it would still

not be easy to realise this policy from a legal perspective. A great deal will depend on exactly how the EU has been weakened.

In this world, in which economic growth is sluggish and Dutch people increasingly have to fend for themselves, there will be a great deal of support for restrictive migration policy.

A restrictive migration policy will also benefit security, provided sufficient attention is paid to the security risks that could be created if foreign nationals in the Netherlands are left with too little support.

Burden on society within the Global and united world

It will be very complicated to realise the *Burden on Society* policy scenario within *the Global and united world*. Amendments are possible, although they will detract substantially from the objective of the policy, i.e. to reduce migration to the greatest extent possible. In the event the Netherlands wishes to maintain this policy framework within the *Global and united world*, the economic structure must be adjusted in a manner that goes against the international trend and support for the policy will be difficult to generate.

The policy is incompatible with an increasingly globalising world in which the international legal order is developing further.

The measures within this policy scenario that restrict economic and family migration will cost us a lot of money in this world of strong economic growth and extensive globalisation. These losses can be partly recouped by robotisation, greater investment in education for Dutch citizens and by relocating sectors abroad in the event no workers are available in the Netherlands. One option would be to see how Brexit works out in practice to enable better assessment of the potential economic damage and only then (e.g. in the first years of the 2020s) to make any drastic decisions, such as denunciation of treaties or withdrawal from the EU completely.

From a legal perspective, the policy can only be realised if the Netherlands withdraws from the international legal order and exits the EU, which would be difficult to imagine within the *Global and united world*.

There will be very little support for this policy scenario in a world characterised by high social cohesion and great demand for international mobility of workers. Amendments are possible, although they will detract from the objective of the policy, i.e. to reduce migration to the greatest extent possible.

Restrictive migration policy can benefit security, although security risks could be created if foreign nationals residing in the Netherlands were left to fend entirely for themselves.

5.5 Conclusion

The Dutch economic interests and Humanitarian mandate policy scenarios are easiest to fit into a world where globalisation is continuing, and where both the international legal order and the EU are strong. Both policy scenarios perform better in a society with strong social cohesion. The Burden on Society policy scenario is most compatible with a world in which globalisation is being reversed, the international legal order is becoming less important and the EU has been weakened. It is a better fit for a world with poor social cohesion. None of the policy scenarios held up in all four environment scenarios. For meaningful policy, regardless of which normative context was used as a starting point, continuous fine-tuning of the policy to the environment will be necessary.

The table below displays the colour scores for each indicator achieved by the policy scenarios when tested within the various contextual scenarios.

Figure 18: Colour Scores per Indicator of the Policy Scenarios within each Contextual Scenario

Dutch economic interests				
Indicators	Global and united	Global and divided	National and united	National and divided
Consistency	Green	Green	Red	Red
Benefits	Green	Green	Green	Green
Legal Feasibility	Red	Red	Green	Green
Support base	Green	Yellow	Yellow	Red
Security	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Red
Humanitarian mandate				
	Global and united	Global and divided	National and united	National and divided
Consistency	Green	Green	Red	Red
Benefits	Yellow	Yellow	Red	Red
Legal Feasibility	Green	Green	Green	Green
Support base	Green	Red	Yellow	Red
Security	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Red
Burden on society				
	Global and united	Global and divided	National and united	National and divided
Consistency	Red	Red	Green	Green
Benefits	Red	Red	Yellow	Yellow
Legal Feasibility	Red	Red	Yellow	Yellow
Support base	Red	Yellow	Red	Green
Security	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow

⁴⁴ The scenarios have been ranked from the most achievable (green, left) to the least achievable (orange, right).

⁴⁵ The scenarios have been ranked from the most achievable (green, left) to unachievable (red, right).

⁴⁶ The scenarios have been ranked from the most achievable (green, left) to the least achievable (orange, right).



Section 6

Onwards to 2030

6.1 Summary of the Futures Study

Introduction

Upon request by the then Minister for Migration to look into the possibilities of a future-proof migration system, the ACVZ presents this 'Onwards to 2030' futures study.

In 2030, when we look back at this study, one thing is certain: the world will not look exactly as described by the ACVZ in the various scenarios in this document. However, it is not unlikely that some of the basic principles and observations in this document may come remarkably close to the 2030 reality. After all, 2030 is only twelve years away. On the other hand, over the next twelve years events may occur that nobody in 2018 saw coming, but which will have a decisive impact on how the world looks in 2030. So although we cannot predict the future, for the development of a medium-term vision of migration in this study future projections have been made as accurately as possible. The result is set out in this report.

Trend analysis and contextual scenarios


To better deal with the uncertain future, for this study the ACVZ has outlined four different 'futures', referred to as 'contextual scenarios'. These scenarios incorporate the developments that are expected to have the biggest impact on migration over the next twelve years (Section 3). The variation in the scenarios is due to the high degree of uncertainty of each development. In devising the environment scenarios, the ACVZ attempted to find the 'most extreme situations imaginable', making sure that the scenarios were sufficiently distinct from each other. Developments that are virtually certain were included in all four scenarios. A trend analysis (Section 2) underpins the scenarios.

The conclusions of the trend analysis are:

- The number of people in Africa and Asia wishing to migrate to Europe will increase, due to population growth and the continuing significant income gap between these continents and Europe.
- It is uncertain whether the next few years will see an increase or decrease in people seeking protection in Europe due to conflict or climate change in their country of origin.
- It is certain that the population of the Netherlands is ageing, but due to uncertainty around economic growth and major changes in society as the result of digitalisation and robotisation, it is difficult to estimate whether, and if so how many, migrants will be needed in the labour market in years to come.
- It is uncertain whether the process of globalisation will continue or will in fact be reversed.

- It is uncertain whether the international legal order will continue to be strengthened or will be weakened.
- It is uncertain whether the EU will be strengthened or weakened.
- It is uncertain whether the divisions in Dutch society will continue to deepen or whether social cohesion will actually increase.

The four contextual scenarios are summarised in the figure below.



Policy scenarios

In terms of migration, normative disagreements in our society are significant, and it is not realistic to imagine that in the next twelve years a consensus will arise around a migration policy direction. There are three different positions that are expected to dominate the migration debate over the next twelve years. In Section 4 the ACVZ has described three policy scenarios, each based on one of these positions. The policy scenarios are:

- *Dutch economic interests*
Objective: To enable the Netherlands to profit economically from migration.
- *Humanitarian mandate*
Objective: To offer protection to refugees and migrants and strengthen their legal status.
- *Burden on society*
Objective: To limit immigration to the Netherlands as much as possible.

In its migration policy between now and 2030, the Netherlands will most likely not follow a single basic normative principle, but will try to combine several principles, as it does now.

Testing the policy scenarios against the environment scenarios

In the fifth section the ACVZ tests the future viability of the three policy scenarios using the four different 'futures' they have devised: the environment scenarios. This testing resulted in the following overall outcomes:

- The 'Dutch economic interests' and 'Humanitarian mandate' policy scenarios are easiest to fit into a world where globalisation is continuing, and where both the international legal order and the EU are strong. Both scenarios perform better in a society with strong social cohesion.
- The 'Burden on society' policy scenario is easiest to apply to a world in which globalisation is being reversed, the international legal order is becoming less important and the EU has been weakened. It is a better fit for a world with poor social cohesion.
- The future viability of all policy scenarios is highly dependent on what the (uncertain) future will look like. None of the policy scenarios held up in all four environment scenarios. Regardless of which normative context was used as a starting point, for meaningful policy continuous fine-tuning of the policy to the environment will be necessary.

An overview of these outcomes is given in [Section 5](#).

6.2 Focus areas for a future-proof migration system

In this study, the ACVZ has described a number of worlds in which we might find ourselves in 2030. However, the ACVZ is not so presumptuous as to use these scenarios to make a prediction about the migration situation in 2030. Accordingly, the making of specific policy recommendations is not in line with the nature of this study. On the other hand, it is possible to formulate a number of focus areas on the basis of this futures study. The report shows that a future-proof migration system requires the development of an integrated, long-term vision, taking the complexity and global nature of migration as a starting point. That vision must cover both refugees and migrants, as well as the interaction between migration and other aspects of Dutch society.

The ACVZ has identified ten key focus areas for the 2018–2030 period.

1. **Politicians, business leaders and citizens must all acknowledge that migration is a phenomenon that isn't going to go away.** It has been part of all periods of history, and will be part of our future. By definition, no country or people can exclude the arrival of newcomers, or completely distance itself from the causes and

consequences thereof. The way forward for any future-proof migration system can only be charted if we bear this reality in mind.

2. **The causes, origins, intensity and methods of migration are constantly changing.** Even if more international migration agreements are made and migration is better regulated at an international level than is currently the case, unexpected and intense migration flows can pose acute challenges for the world – and thus also for the Netherlands. An effective migration policy is one that considers both the structural aspects and an optimal response to acute challenges. This means that flexibility is required in any future-proof migration system (ACVZ, 2017).
3. **Addressing the root causes of forced migration must be a central part of all policy measures (including those outside the area of migration).** Forced migration is not desirable for anyone – not the refugee or migrant, nor the countries of transit, nor the destination countries. Conflict is a key driver of forced migration to Europe. The trend analysis showed that investment in conflict prevention, reconstruction after a conflict ends, and socioeconomic development in general and education in particular, can contribute to reducing conflicts. It is possible that in the future, climate change as well as conflict will contribute to forced migration to Europe. Investing *now* in measures to curb climate change and in the resilience of societies to cope with the consequences of climate change, can contribute to preventing climate migration in the future.
4. **Contributing to high-quality and forward-looking reception in the regions must be a central part of all policy measures (including those outside the area of migration).** The creation and funding of high-quality reception in the regions (not only a roof over one's head, but also adequate food, health and medical facilities, sufficient employment opportunities and, last but not least, good education for children and young people) is regarded as sensible policy in all circumstances in this future projections study, regardless of which vision of migration is used as the basic principle.
5. **Migration policy must be information-led and data-driven and must include all stages of the process.** In the first instance, this has to be done in the fight against the root causes of forced migration and in reception in the regions. Next, in guarding the borders, providing adequate reception for asylum seekers in the Netherlands, returning those who no longer have a right to be here, and ensuring that those who have obtained that right can participate in society as quickly and as

completely as possible. This includes determining the demand for economic migrants (such as students and migrant workers to meet shortages in the labour market and to promote the innovative character of the economy) and providing an attractive climate for settlement.

6. **Proper cooperation at an international, inter-governmental and inter-departmental level is essential.** Migration policy affects many other policy areas, and conversely measures in other policy areas can affect migration. Cooperation is required to maintain a clear overview of relevant developments, to pursue effective policies and to have an influence on international migration policy.

7. **In assessing the usefulness of migration policy instruments, we must remain vigilant to the possible consequences for social cohesion.**

The degree of social cohesion in a community largely determines the success of many of the policy instruments relating to migration. Policy instruments that carry a risk of undermining social cohesion put pressure on the success of other migration policy measures.

8. **For each measure in the area of migration, it is necessary to consider the impact on specific groups and on society as a whole.**

Migration policy does not only affect newcomers, it also affects the position of those who already live in the Netherlands. Less generous rules for family migration, for example, also impact on Dutch people with transnational families. The expectation is that family relationships will be even more important in the future, because family members will be more dependent on each other. This factor must be taken into account, particularly if the welfare state continues to be converted into a participatory society. Another example is that a liberal migration policy can be good for the economy, but vulnerable groups in society may be put under pressure. In such a case an accompanying policy would obviously be required, which would include investment to improve the living conditions of and opportunities for vulnerable groups in society.

9. **Research is required into whether the social security system is sufficiently migration-proof. If necessary, the system must be adjusted to better fit these modern times.**

10. **To generate and maintain public support, the government needs to openly and unambiguously communicate with social actors and society at large. To implement an information-led, data-driven migration policy, there must be a uniform and shared understanding. An annual 'State of Migration' may meet both**



needs. Communication from the government about migration must be done on the basis of factual, clearly-explained information and by openly outlining issues, opportunities, dilemmas and paths to solutions. Social debate must be fuelled and conducted at a political and administrative level, for example on the basis of monthly statistics and the publication of an annual comprehensive overview of all efforts *and* results in the broad area of migration. In specific terms, this means focusing on:

- The international aspects (international cooperation, combating the root causes of forced migration, reception in the regions, monitoring the borders and European cooperation, return).
- The asylum process: reception, admissions and departures.
- The size and nature of economic and family migration.
- Duration of stay, transit migration, granting Dutch citizenship.
- Enforcement actions such as revocations and fines.
- Demand from the Dutch economy, with regard to both shortages in the labour market and the need for innovation capacity.
- Participation and integration of refugees, migrants and Dutch citizens with a migration background.
- Consequences of migration policy for social cohesion and the impact of migration policy on specific groups in society and on society as a whole.
- The migration resilience of our social security system.

An annual 'State of Migration' will provide more insight into all relevant aspects of migration, considered together, than the current bi-annual 'Rapportage vreemdelingenketen' (*Immigration Services Report*). This can raise the quality of the social debate on the desirable direction for migration policy and improve understanding of the effectiveness of the policy. These are two important requirements for future-proofing our migration system.

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